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UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AND THE "LABOR
DISPUTE" DISQUALIFICATION
MILTON I. SHAD1R*
VEN THE MOST simple of legal concepts, given moderate atten-
tion by a court over a few years, acquires a judicial gloss of
altered meaning.' When the single concept becomes a dozen,
many of them unfamiliar and all of them undefined by the statutes-
when the single court is replaced by those of fifty-one jurisdictions-the
same few years thicken the gloss into an opaque shell beneath which
the concepts themselves are increasingly obscured. Once this process has
made the intended meaning of the statute purely academic, the subject
is one appropriate for a law review article.
I. THE RULE-BLANKET DENIAL OF COMPENSATION
Early in 1937 Illinois and Missouri fell into line as the last states to
enact unemployment compensation statutes. Under the pressure of meet-
ing the deadline to qualify for credits under the federal Social Security
Act,2 most state legislatures had hurriedly' taken advantage of the
"Draft Bills" prepared by the Committee on Economic Security.' The
resulting uniformity was comparable to that effected by the Uniform
Sales Act.
Each statute, whether modeled after the Draft Bills or not, enacted a
specific disqualification provision barring from benefits workers unem-
* Member of the Illinois Bar.
'Striking examples of the effect of court-created "gloss" on decision law are Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. i (i949), and Hotel and Restaurant Employees Internat'l Alliance v.
WERB, 315 U.S. 437 (1942). In the former the state court's construction of an ordinance was
held to infringe petitioner's right of free speech; in the latter the "gloss" saved an anti-picket-
ing injunction from the same fate.
2 49 Stat. 620 (1935), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3oi ff. (i943). In sustaining the constitutionality of
the federal act, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the states' decisions to enact
statutes which would entitle them to the go per cent rebate were compelled by duress or co-
ercion. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 3oi U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937).
3 "The governors of state after state now convened their legislatures in special sessions
'to come under the wire,' and these sessions enacted unemployment compensation laws
without giving any real consideration to their provisions." Witte, Development of Unem-
ployment Compensation, 55 Yale L.J. 21, 33 (1946).
4 Social Security Board, Draft Bills for State Unemployment Compensation of the Pooled
Fund and Employer Reserve Account Types (1936); ibid. (rev. ed. 1937).
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ployed during labor disputes. The Illinois provision typifies the majority
Draft Bill enactment:
An individual shall be ineligible for benefits....
For any week with respect to which it is found that his total or partial unemploy-
ment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory,
establishment, or other premises, at which he is or was last employed, provided, that
this subsection shall not apply if it is shown that (i) He is not participating in or financ-
ing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work and
(2) He does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which immediately before the
commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at
which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly
interested in the dispute; provided, that if in any case separate branches of work which
are commonly conducted as separate businesses in separate premises are conducted in
separate departments of the same premises, each such department shall, for the pur-
pose of this subsection, be deemed to be a separate factory, establishment, or other
premises.s
With every phrase a potential breeder of litigation, careful study of the
statutes and their history becomes increasingly important to proper de-
cision of compensation claims.
s Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 48, § 2 23(d). This version received the most widespread adoption
of the several Draft Bills and will be referred to herein as "the Draft Bill." Although the pro-
visos offer considerable variation, thirty-three other statutes contain substantially the same
basic disqualification provision. Ariz. Code Ann. (Supp. i947) § 56-ioo4(d); Ark. Stat. Ann.
(1947) § 8i-ixo6(d); Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1949) c. 167 A, § 5(c); 41 Del. L. (i943)
c. 207, §6; Ga. Code Ann. (Supp. i947) § 54-61o(d); Hawaii Rev. Laws (i945) § 423i(d);
Idaho Code (1949) § 72-1366(j); Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, Supp. 1947) § 52-1539 c; Iowa Code
Ann. (1949) § 96.5.4; Kan. Gen. Stat. (Corrick, Supp. 1947) § 44-7o6(d); Me. L. (1949) c. 430,
§ zs-IV; Md. Ann. Code (Flack, Supp. 1947) art. 95 A, § 5(e); Mass. Ann. Laws (1942)
c. 151 A, § 25(b); Mich. Stat. Ann. (Reis, Supp. 1947) § 17-53I(b); Miss. Code Ann. (Supp.
1948) § 7379(e); Mo. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1948) § 9431 II(a); Mont. Rev. Code (Darlington,
Supp. 1939) § 3 o3 3 .8(d); Neb. Rev. Stat. (i943) § 48-628(d); N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 218,
§ 4D, as amended N.H. L. (1949) c. z85; N.J. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1948) § 43 :21-5(d); N.M.
Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1947) § 57-8o5(d); N.C. Gen. Stat. (Michie, Supp. i947) § 9 6-,4(d); N.D.
Rev. Code (i943) § 52-0602.4; Okla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1948) tit. 40, § 215(d); Pa. Stat. Ann.
(Purdon, Supp. 1948) tit. 43, § 402(d), as amended Pa. L. (1949) Act 530; S.D. Code (1939)
§ 17.o83o(4); Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1947) art. 5221b-3(d); Utah Code Ann.
(1943) § 42-2a-5(d); Vt. L. (1949) H. 212, § 5379V; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 1887(97)
(d); Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, Supp. z943) § 9998-io5(f); W.Va. Code Ann. (Michie,
1943) §2366(78)(4); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1945) §54-1o5B 11.
Other acts are not so readily grouped into distinct categories. Ala. Code Ann. (Michie,
Supp. 1946) tit. 26, § 214 A; Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. (949) 5i-5-4 (d); Cal. Gen. Laws(Deering, i944) Act 878od, § 56(a); Conn. Gen. Stat. (t949) § 7508(3); D.C. Code (Supp.
1948) tit. 46, § 310(f); Fla. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1948) § 443.06(4); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Baldwin,
1948) § 341.36o(i); La. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Dart, Supp. 1947) § 4434.4(d); Minn. Stat. Ann.
(Mason, 1945) § 268.09 subd. i(6); Nev. Comp. Laws (Supp. i945) § 2825.o5(d); N.Y. Lab.
Law (McKimnney, 1948) § 592.1; Ohio Code Ann. (Throckmorton, 1948) § 1345-6d(i); Ore.
Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1947) § 126-705 (d); R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 284, § 7(4); S.C. Code
of Laws (1942) § 7035-82(d); Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1948) § 69oI.2 9E; Wis. Stat.(Brossard, 1947) § io8.o4(io). The distinctions will be discussed infra under the various
subheadings.
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THEORIES JUSTIFYING LABOR-DISPUTE DISQUALIFICATION
Among the several theoretical bases for the labor-dispute provisions,
one has assumed unmerited prominence in judicial decisions. The states'
1936 rush to enact the "Draft Bills" has already been mentioned. Un-
fortunately, part of the package adopted by the state legislatures was a
ready-made "Declaration of Public Policy," raising as a buffer against
constitutional attack the spectre of "involuntary unemployment." 6 As a
result many courts have devoted more time to explaining why claimants'
unemployment was "voluntary" so as to impose disqualification than to
applying the actual terms of the labor-dispute provision itself.7 "The
term 'involuntary unemployment' has induced unrealistic controversy
over the freedom of the will and tended to blur the outlines of specific
disqualifications and eligibility conditions."' Yet, despite the fact that
it fails to explain much of the statutory language, the doctrine that the
right to benefits should be gauged by the "involuntary" nature of un-
employment must be recognized as the most influential theory in current
case law.
Perhaps more plausible, though less often referred to by the courts,9
6 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949) C. 48, § 217. This rationale was hardly original with
the authors of the Draft Bills. Compare Douglas, Standards of Unemployment Insurance 59
(1933).
7 The Illinois Supreme Court has been one of the chief exponents of this approach. Its first
three decisions involving labor-dispute disqualification laid particular stress on the statu-
tory "public-policy" declaration. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Durkin, 38o Ill. 11, 42 N.E. 2d
541 (1942); Walgreen Co. v. Murphy, 386 Ill. 32, 53 N.E. 2d 390 (1944); Local Union No. ii
v. Gordon, 396 Ill. 293, 71 N.E. 2d 637 (1947). Since then the emphasis has diminished some-
what, perhaps because the court has been confronted with situations which cannot be ex-
plained on the basis of "voluntariness." Compare Local No. 658 v. Brown Shoe Co., 403
Ill. 484,87 N.E. 2d 625 (i949). In California the state supreme courthasfound the "voluntary-
involuntary" dichotomy a source of dissension and controversy. Compare McKiniey v. Cali-
fornia Employment Stabilization Comm'n, 209 P. 2d 602 (Cal., i949) with Bunny's Waffle
Shop, Inc. v. California Employment Security Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 735, i5i P. 2d 224 (1944).
8 Harrison, Eligibility and Disqualification for Benefits-Forenote: Statutory Purpose
and "Involuntary Unemployment," 55 Yale L.J. I17, 119 (1946). The general inadequacy of
"involuntary unemployment" as an explanation of the disqualifications is clear. Under the
statutes benefits are payable to employees who leave work voluntarily with good cause or
who voluntarily refuse "unsuitable" work. Lesser, Labor Disputes and Unemployment
Compensation, 55 Yale L.J. 167, 171 (1946). Benefits are denied employees who be-
come involuntarily unemployed due to a lockout. Fierst and Spector, Unemployment Com-
pensation in Labor Disputes, 49 Yale L.J. 461, 464 (194o). And a recent law-review
note occupies seventeen pages in discussing disqualifications inconsistent with the sug-
gested theory. Eligibility for Unemployment Benefits of Persons Involuntarily Unemployed
because of Labor Disputes, 49 Col. L. Rev. 550 (i949).
9 For brief statements of the doctrine, see Lawrence Baking Co. v. Michigan UCC, 3o8
Mich. 198, 213, 13 N.W. 2d 26o, 265 (1944); Matson Terminals, Inc. v. California Employ-
ment Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 695, 707, 151 P. d 202, 209 (i944); In re Steelman, 219 N.C. 3o6,
310, 13 S.E. d 544, 547 (1941); Chrysler Corp. v. Smith, 297 Mich. 438, 447, 298 N.W. 87, 90
(1941).
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is the notion of state "neutrality" in labor disputes. This view is notable
at least for its age, having been a basis for the i91i British Act.'0 It
usually appears today in the form of the often-repeated statement that
disqualification must result whether the dispute is manifested by a
"strike" or a "lockout," since "neither the unreasonableness of the
demands nor the merits of the dispute have any place in the determi-
nation of the question whether the labor dispute actually exists.""
But it should be obvious that such lack of interest in the merits is
merely the statement of a dubious conclusion. "Formal neutrality"'"
was originally urged primarily because of the belief that fixing responsi-
bility for the dispute would be too difficult. The unreality of this theory
has since been demonstrated.' Moreover, the notion that governmental
neutrality is to be desired as an end in itself has been objected to as
ignoring the realities of already established government intervention in
labor relations by means of minimum wage laws, workmen's compen-
sation laws, and the Wagner Act. 4
Finally, it has been questioned whether nonpayment of labor-dispute
benefits qualifies even as a "formal neutrality." First, the "very existence
of the law with the promise of benefits to those who do not in concert
with other workers refrain from working amounts to considerable pres-
sure to deter workers from combining their economic strength. This is
is See Hughes, Principles Underlying Labor-Dispute Disqualification 1 (1946).
"Bankston Creek Collieries, Inc. v. Gordon, 399 Ill. 291, 299, 77 N.E. 2d 670, 675 (1948);
9 Unemployment Compensation Interpretation Service, Benefit Series, No. 9, Case No. 10786
(Ga. R, 1946).
Cases reported in the Benefit Series, a Social Security Board publication containing selected
unemployment compensation decisions from all jurisdictions, will hereinafter be cited as
follows: 9 B.S. 9-10786 (Ga. R, 1946). The letter "A" indicates a decision by the initial ad-
ministrative tribunal; "D," by an intermediate body; "R," by the highest administrative
appellate tribunal of the state.
Decisions of the British Umpire under the British Acts reported in Benefit Series General
Supplement No. r, Benefit Decisions of the British Umpire: A Codification and Text of Se-
lected Decisions, will be referred to by both their official and Benefit Series citations: Brit.
Ump. 1480/1927, BU-495 (1927).
z2Douglas, op. cit. supra note 6, at 61; cf. 5 B.S. 6-7330 (Ill. D, 1941): "This [denying bene-
fits regardless of who may be the instigator of the dispute] does not result in favoring one party
at the expense of the other, but on the other hand leaves both parties exactly where they were
with regard to all of their rights, privileges and obligations outside of those contained in this
one Section 7(d) of the Illinois Unemployment Compensation Act."
13 In 1933 Professor (now Senator) Douglas relied for his examples on society's failure to fix
guilt on the aggressor in warfare as well as in industrial conflict. Douglas, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 61. The Nuremberg trials provide an answer to the first example; the Wagner and Taft-
Hartley definitions of unfair labor practices, to the second.
14 Lesser, op. cit. supra note 8, at 175-76; Schindler, Collective Bargaining and Unemploy-
ment Insurance Legislation, 38 Col. L. Rev. 858, 869 (1938).
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particularly true if union membership or the payment of union dues
is construed to amount to participation in, or financing of, the dispute."' 5
Second, the Wagner Act has been pointed to as establishing a "recog-
nized public policy of equalizing bargaining power between employers
and employees.... Since the employer is usually capable of greater en-
durance than his workers, a strictly neutral state would merely be ad-
justing the unequal balance if it made generous immediate payments."' 6
Thus the rationale of state neutrality has been subjected to dual
attack: on its theoretical legitimacy and on its proper application to
the problem of unemployment benefits. But once again, the attacks
cannot obscure the fact that the rationale is present and must be dealt
with in evaluating the acts and decisions under them.
Allied to the neutrality argument is the contention that we cannot
"attribute to the legislature an intent to finance strikes out of unem-
ployment compensation funds.""17 Insofar as this conclusion represents a
feeling of unfairness in requiring an employer to finance workers against
himself, it is refutable by a showing that the economic incidence of pay-
roll taxes is shifted by the employer either to the consumer or back to
his employees.' 8 And to the extent that it indicates a belief that granting
benefits will actually "finance" strikes, several partial answers are avail-
able. One lies in the relative magnitudes of compensation and wages 9
and another in the waiting period that all laws require before benefits
may be paid. True enough, if a strike lasts long enough, the receipt of
compensation will ease the drain on the union treasury, increasing stay-
ing power and hence the probability of the strike's success. But most
strikes are of lesser duration than the usual benefit waiting period, and
even with the additional incentive for holding out, the feared "financing"
would not always materialize. In any event, the prospect of receiving a
fraction of normal wages after the lapse of several weeks will seldom
lead a labor organization to call a strike which it would have avoided
had benefits not been payable.
is Lesser, op. cit. supra note 8, at 175.
16 Fierst and Spector, op. cit. supra note 8, at 465. Whatever the theoretical validity of this
argument, it would undoubtedly receive short shrift from the legislators who authored and
adopted the Taft-Hartley Act and comparable state enactments.
"Local Union No. ii v. Gordon, 396 Ill. 293, 303, 71 N.E. 2d 637, 642 (I947); Muncie
Foundry Division v. Review Board, Ix4 Ind. App. 475, 5i N.E. 2d 89i (1943); 8 B.S. ii-
10025 (Mo. D, 1945); see Pribram, Compensation for Unemployment during Industrial Dis-
putes, 51 MonthlyLab. Rev. 1375, 1376 (i94o).
is Bums, Toward Social Security 157-61 (1936); Yoder, Some Economic Implications of
Employment Insurance, 45 Q.J. Econ. 622, 635 (1931); Brown, The Incidence of Compulsory
Insurance of Workmen, 30 J. Pol. Econ. 67, 76 (1922).
" Illinois' 1949 amendment to its Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 48, § 22o(b)(I), raised
maximum benefits to $25 per week, an amount typical of the higher-benefit-paying states.
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Even to the extent that actual financing may sometimes take place,
the reply can be made that some strikes deserve to be financed as
attempts, after failure of collective bargaining, to protect positive rights
given employees by other legislation or by contract.2 ° In fact, the ob-
jection to financing strikes loses its impact whenever the shutdown has
resulted from clearly unreasonable conduct on the part of the em-
ployer.2 This third argument, then, is not nearly so persuasive as it
might initially appear.
Other theories are available as secondary explanations of the labor-
dispute provisions.22 But the three already stated are sufficiently weighty
20 In io B.S. Io--i848 (Ill. R, 1946) miners left work because their employer had failed
to conform to the statute defining and requiring adequate shower facilities for coal mines.
In 2 B.S. 5-1430 (R.L D, 1939) the employer had violated the wage provisions of a bargaining
agreement by seeking to establish a piecework system, and the employees struck because the
piecework rates would not allow them to earn the minimum wages prescribed by state law.
Both decisions held that, since the conditions of employment in question were statutory
and outside the proper area of negotiation, the work stoppages were not due to "labor dis-
putes." This administratively created exception has long been approved by the British
Umpires. Brit. Ump. 6138/36 (U936); Brit. Ump. 3o6/1929, BU-445 (1929); Brit. Ump.
2358, BU-444 (1922); Ministry of Labour, Analytical Guide U.I. Code 7, Part MI, §§ 11-13
(1939 ed.).
After the Illinois decision cited above, the state supreme court held that a labor dispute
may exist even though the employer's action leading to the controversy is in violation of his
contractual obligations. Local Union No. ii v. Gordon, 396 Ill. 293, 71 N.E. 2d 637 (1947).
When another coal mine case arose in which unemDloyment was caused by protest against
alleged violations of statutory safety requirements, the hearing officer relied on the Local
No. ii case to deny benefits. The logical basis asserted for this new result was that breach of a
statutory duty cannot preclude existence of a labor dispute any more than does the breach of
a contractual duty. ii B.S. 12-12964 (Ill. A, z948).
Apparently, however, the Illinois Supreme Court was more impressed with the earlier
approach. In Fash v. Gordon, 398 Ill. 210, 75 N.E. 2d 294 (z947), the court con-
sidered the effect of a War labor Board directive dealing with the issues in a labor dispute.
The decision carefully pointed out that the WLB determination was not binding on the
parties, so that the directive had not terminated the labor dispute. Compare similar decisions
in 9 B.S. 9-10786 (Ga. R, 1946); 9 B.S. io-zogo6 (N.Y. R, r945). By implication, had the
WLE directive been made conclusive, the court would have regarded the "labor dispute" as
ended even though active controversy continued; see 5 B.S. 4-7169 (N.J. D, z941). The area
of conflict between the Local No. ii and Fash cases is not yet defined and the Director of
Labor is faced with a difficult choice.
21 See text at 304-07 infra for proposed statutory changes partially based on this premise.
22 One argument often advanced is that the difficulty of actuarial prediction of the incidence
of labor disputes should prevent the allowance of benefits for unemployment caused by such
disputes. Miners in General Group v. Hix, 123 W.Va. 637, 646, 17 S.E. 2d 8io, 815 (194);
Hughes, op. cit. supra note ro, at i; Pribram, op. cit. supra note 17, at 1376. Yet, as pointed
out in Eligibility for Unemployment Benefits of Persons Involuntarily Unemployed because
of Labor Disputes, 49 Col. L. Rev. 55o, 55r (1949), "virtually every American jurisdiction
today allows benefits during at least some of these 'actuarially unpredictable' labor dis-
putes... ." Furthermore, a statistical objection is hardly one which helps answer the question
of whether disqualification can be justified as a matter of principle. Accordingly, the argu-
ment will not be used as a basis for discussion in this article.
Justification for the "grade or class" provision of the statutes depends on still another
theory, discussed in text at notes I74-75 infra.
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in themselves, and exploration of the manifold aspects of the state sta-
tutes compels traveling light.
THE MEANING OF A "LABOR DISPUTE"
Nearly all of the fifty-one statutes employ the term "labor dispute"
or its equivalent, but only a few attempt any definition or limitation of
those words."s However, one clue as to meaning has been inserted in
every statute in order to satisfy the minimum requirements of the federal
Social Security Act. The state statutes provide without exception that
benefits shall not be denied to an otherwise eligible employee if he re-
fuses to accept new work when the position offered is vacant due to a
"strike, lockout, or other labor dispute,"24 such a job not constituting
"suitable work." This phrase indicates not only that "strikes" and "lock-
outs" are species within the genus "labor dispute" but also that a statu-
tory "labor dispute" may exist in the absence of the strike or lockout
manifestations. 5
Without further evidence of meaning within the statutes themselves,
courts and adminstrators have been compelled to look elsewhere. Their
most convenient sources for ready-made definitions are, of course, the
Wagner21 and Taft-Hartley Acts,27 the Norris-LaGuardia Act,28 and
23 The Alabama statute defines "labor dispute" by repeating the Norris-LaGuardia Act
terminology; the Arizona act refers to "labor dispute, strike, or lockout"; Arkansas excepts
"lockouts" from the term "labor dispute"; Colorado disqualifies only for "strikes"; Connecti-
cut provides that a lockout disqualifies only if it results from demands by employees as dis-
tinguished from an employer's attempt to deprive his workers of a present advantage; the
District of Columbia act speaks of a labor dispute "such as a strike, lockout, or jurisdictional
labor dispute"; Kentucky refers to "strike or other bona-fide labor dispute" but excepts lock-
outs; in Minnesota the disqualification clause applies to a "strike or other labor dispute,"
adopting the state Labor Relations Act definition of the latter term but excluding lockouts;
Mississippi excludes the "unjustified lockout" from disqualification; New Hampshire excepts
any work stoppage "due solely to a lockout"; the New York act specifies "strike, lockout or
other industrial controversy"; Ohio refers to "labor dispute other than a lockout"; Rhode
Island's provision includes "strike or other industrial controversy"; Utah disqualifies for a
"strike involving his grade, class or group of worker"; Wisconsin includes "strike or other
bona fide labor dispute." The statutory citations may be found at note 5 supra.
24 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. ('949) c. 48, § 223(c)(2).
2S For a discussion of the most common nonstrike, nonlockout dispute, see text infra at
notes 33-35.
26 The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or condi-
tions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regard-
less of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."
49 Stat. 450 (1934), 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(a) (1947).
27 63 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(9) (Supp. 1948).
28 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 113(c) (1947) (identical with the Wagner Act except
that no reference is made to "tenure").
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their state counterparts. Although the decisions regularly point out that
they "are not bound by the definition of a labor dispute contained in
the Federal statutes,)2 9 the results reached invariably conform to the
federal definitions . 0 The net result has been a carry-over of the sweep-
ing, all-inclusive interpretations of the anti-injunction and labor rela-
tions statutes into the unemployment compensation field.
This wholesale adoption of already-established broad definitions has
been assailed by most writers on the premise that imparting different
meanings to "labor dispute" in the different types of statutes involves
less inconsistency than does a uniform interpretation:
The purpose of anti-injunction legislation, as has so often been pointed out, is to lessen
the abuses resulting from injunctions in industrial disputes. By expanding the term
"labor dispute," the maximum protection is attained. However, since the purpose of
unemployment insurance is to provide compensation for loss of employment, any dis-
qualifications, such as for labor disputes, should be strictly construed. This calls for a
narrow interpretation of labor dispute in the field of unemployment insurance. 3!
29 Miners in General Group v. Hix, 123 W.Va. 637, 646, i7 S.E. 2d 8io, 8r5 (194i); cf.
Block Coal & Coke Co. v. UMW, 177 Tenn. 247, I48 S.W. 2d 364 (i94I). In Exparte Pesnell,
240 Ala. 457, I09 So. 726 (i94o), denying cert. to 29 Ala. App. 528, I99 So. 720 (1940), cert.
den. 313 U.S. 590 (1941), the Alabama Supreme Court was equally careful: "But we do not con-
strue the opinion [of the lower court] as indicating any binding force or effect of these defini-
tions so far as our own statute is concerned, but the citations are only by way of illustration,
and so to be considered."
30 One of the few opinions in which these definitions were flatly rejected by a court was that
in the Department of Industrial Relations v. Drummond, 30 Ala. App. 78, iSo. 2d 395 (941),
cert. den. 24 r Ala. 142, I So. 2d 402 (r941) (prior to enactment of provision referred to in
note 23 supra). Examples of the more usual result, in which the federal statutes become con-
trolling in fact, though not in theory, are numerous: Dallas Fuel Co. v. Home, 230 Iowa 1148,
300 N.W. 303 (1941); Huerta v. E. Regensburg & Sons, 7 B.S. 11-8891 (Fla. C. Ct.,
x944); Snyder v. Consolidation Coal Co., 5 B.S. 7-7415 (Md. C. Ct., 1941); 9 B.S.
4/5-io5oo (Va. R, i945); 9 B.S. 3-o387 (Ohio A, 1945); 9 B.S. 2-10296 (Pa. A, 1945);
9 B.S. 2-10233 (Ark. D, 1945); 8 B.S. 11-10025 (Mo. D, 1945); 7 B.S. 5-8532 (Mich. A,
i943); 5 B.S. 9-7528 (N.J. D, 1941); 4 B.S. 7-613I (Idaho A, 1940); 4 B.S. 3-5353 (Miss.
R, I940).
Occasionally the courts reach the more extreme conclusion that the federal statutory
definitions are binding on them, usually as the result of fallacious reasoning. Barnes v. Hall,
285 Ky. 6o, 148 S.W. 2d 929 (i94o), cert. den. 314 U.S. 628 (i94i); Sandoval v. Industrial
Comm'n, IO Colo. IoS, 130 P. 2d 930 (1942).
3'Fierst and Spector, op. cit. supra note 8, at 475; cf. 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 751, 754 n. 25,
(1942), noting Magner v. Kinney, 141 Neb. 122, 2 N.W. 2d 689 (1942) ("liberal labor policy"\
requires narrow definition in unemployment acts, broad in anti-injunction); 36 Ill. L. Rev.
58z, s8s n. 19 (1942), noting Chrysler Corp. v. Smith, 297 Mich. 438, 298 N.W. 87 (194)
(same); 17 Ind. L.J. 250 (1942), noting Barnes v. Hall, 285 Ky. i6o, 146 S.W. 2d 929 (1940),
cert. den. 314 U.S. 628 (94I) (same); i6 Tenn. L. Rev. 1007, 1009 (I941), noting Block Coal
& Coke Co. v. UMW, 177 Tenn. 247, 148 S.W. 2d 364 (r94r) (inconsistent construction should
result from "liberalism toward labor"); Schindler, op. cit. supra note 14, at 879. But see
Arterburn, "Labor Disputes" and Unemployment Compensation: A Reply, 17 Ind. L.J.
446 (1942), sharply criticizing the above rationale for unique reasons.
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But this self-styled "liberal" approach runs counter to basic notions
of precedent, amounting to no more than an assertion that a term which
had already acquired a commonly accepted, "ordinary" meaning through
prior legislation should not have been employed in the compensation
acts. The short answer is that the same term was used.3" Courts should
not manufacture a distinction that the legislatures have not seen fit to
create.
Even more important from a practical view, the device of narrow
interpretation cannot make itself felt in any significant class of cases.
Lockouts, like strikes, could not be excluded from the labor-dispute cate-
gory unless a court indulged in distortion rather than definition.
3 3 Just
how small an area this leaves for interpretation may readily be seen by
glancing at the nonstrike, nonlockout situation which has most often
been presented to the courts: unemployment which results from the
expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. Almost all the cases
have dealt with the invocation of the "no contract, no work" formula
in the coal industry. In accordance with common understanding-and
incidentally with the Wagner and Norris-LaGuardia Act definitions-
the decisions have refused to allow the absence of an employer-employee
relationship to preclude the holding that a labor dispute existed.3 4 Dis-
32 "No doubt the meaning those words had in the mind of the General Assembly was the
same as that expressed in defining them in the act concerning injunctions in labor disputes.'
Conte v. Egan, 135 Conn. 367, 371, 64 A. 2d 534, 535 (1949). Other decisions relying on "labor
dispute" definitions in prior state statutes are Adkins v. Indiana Employment Security Divi-
sion, 117 Ind. App. 132, 7o N.E. 2d,3i (1946); Spielmann v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 Wis. 240,
295 N.W. i (,940); Koski v. UCC, 7 B.S. 1o-885i (Ore. C. Ct., 1944); 5 B.S. 10-7614
(Minn. A, 1942); 4 B.S. 2-5232 (N.Y. A, i94o). In Local Union No. ii v. Gordon, 396 Ill.
293, 71 N.E. 2d 637 (1947), the court pointed out that the state anti-injunction act was nar-
rower in coverage than the federal statutes, but that it did not have to decide which was con-
trolling.
33 Five distinct grounds were stated by the Washington Supreme Court for declaring that
a lockout was a "labor dispute" in In re North River Logging Co., i5 Wash. 2d 204, 13 0 P. 2d
64 (1942); cf. The Midvale Co. v. UCB of Review, 67 A. 2d 380 (Pa. Super. Ct., 1949); Bucko
v. J. F. Quest Foundry Co., 38 N.W. 2d 223 (Minn., 1949); Adkins v. Indiana Employment
Security Division, 117 Ind. App. 132, 70 N.E. 2d 31 (1946). Perhaps most conclusive is that,
even in those acts which refer to "labor disputes" without further elaboration in the dis-
qualification section, the "suitable work" clause invariably speaks of "strike, lockout, or other
labor dispute."
34 Johnson v. Iowa Employment Security Comm'n, 32 N.W. 2d 786 (Iowa, 1948); Walter
Bledsoe Coal Co. v. Review Board, 221 Ind. i6, 46 N.E. 2d 477 (1943), followed in Peabody
Coal Co. v. Lambermont, X12 Ind. App. 718,46 N.E. 2d 7o6 (1943); Dallas Fuel Co. v. Home,
230 Iowa 1148, 3oo N.W. 303 (x941); Block Coal & Coke Co. v. UMW, 177 Tenn. 247, 148
S.W. 2d 364 (1941); Miners in General Group v. Hix, 123 W.Va. 637, 17 S.E. 2d 8o (1i94);
Department of Industrial Relations v. Pesnell, 29 Ala. App. 528, 199 So. 720 (i94o), cert. den.
240 Ala. 457, J99 So. 726 (i94o), cert. den. 313 U.S. 590 (1941); Barnes v. Hall, 285 Ky. 16o,
146 S.W. 3d 929 (i94o), cert. den. 314 U.S. 628 (1941); Peabody Coal Co. v. Gordon, 12 B.S.
7-13520 (Ill. Super. Ct., 1949); Metz v. Coal Operators, io B.S. 6-11549 (Md. C. Ct.,
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qualification has therefore been nearly universally imposed. In fact,
courts even in the few states which deny benefits only for "strikes" have
been influenced by the "labor dispute" cases and have also refused to
award compensation. 35 It is obvious that the mere doctrine of narrow
construction cannot prevail to transform a clear-cut labor dispute into
some other type of animal. It is equally obvious that there are few situ-
ations indeed in which it is not clear whether a labor dispute exists.
The answer is the same if, instead of exploring anti-injunction sta-
tutes, the courts seek definitions in dictionaries, 36 the "suitable work"
provisions of the compensation acts,"7 the Restatement of Torts,3 8 or the
British Unemployment Insurance Act. 9 "Labor dispute" is insufficiently
flexible to exclude fact situations in which it may be concluded that bene-
fits should be allowed as a matter of principle. Its scope is broad enough
to cover nearly every controversy relating to conditions of work and
involving more than a single employee.4" In short, encroachments on the
1947); Decision 42, 2 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep. 7525 (Ark. Special Examiner, 1946); see
Bankston Creek Collieries, Inc. v. Gordon, 399 Ill. 291, 77 N.E. 2d 670 (1948). Each of these
cases involved the coal industry.
Only a few decisions, none by an appellate court, have allowed benefits on the ground that
no "labor dispute" was involved. 7 B.S. 2-8377 (Kan. D, 1943) (coal mines); cf. 4 B.S. 2-
5232 (N.Y. A, 194o) (cloak and suit workers); 4 B.S. 2-5227 (N.J. D, r94o) (same).
3s Baker v. Powhatan Mining Co., 146 Ohio St. 6oo, 67 N.E. 2d 714 (1946), rejecting the
approach taken in United States Coal Co. v. UCB of Review, 66 Ohio App. 329, 32 N.E. 2d
763 (i94o); Sandoval v. Industrial Comm'n, iio Colo. io8, 13o P. 2d 93 o (1942); cf. Employees
of Lion Coal Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, ioo Utah 207, 111 P. 2d 797 (1941)- It is true that a
"strike" contemplates a continuing employer-employee relationship, while expiration of the
contract technically terminates that relationship. Nevertheless the parties in the latter case
expect that the miners will return to work for the same employers once differences are settled.
If, then, the employees' demands have been the motivating force in the work stoppage, it makes
good sense to call the situation a "strike." However, the case is close enough so that the public
policy favoring strict construction of disqualifications might throw the result the other way.
Thus, benefits were allowed by the court in the United States Coal Co. case, supra.
36 Block Coal & Coke Co. v. UMW, 177 Tenn. 247, 148 S.W. 2d 364 (941); Miners in
General Group v. Hix, 123 W.Va. 637, 17 S.E. 2d 81o (1941); Ex parte Pesnell, 24o Ala. 457,
199 So. 726 (1940), denying cert. 29 Ala. App. 528, 199 So. 720 (i94o), cert. den. 313
U.S. 590 (1941); United States Coal Co. v. UCB of Review, 66 Ohio App. 329, 32 N.E. 2d
763 (1940).
37 UCC of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143 (1946) (refusing to decide the applicability of the
Wagner and Norris-LaGuardia Acts); Miners in General Group v. Hix, 123 W.Va. 637, 17S.E. 2d 8io (1941).
38 Baker v. Powhatan Mining Co., 146 Ohio St. 6oo, 67 N.E. 2d 714 (1946); Sandoval v.
Industrial Comm'n, 11o Colo. io8, 130 P. 2d 930 (1942); 12 B.S. 3-13242 (Ohio R, 1948).
39 3 B.S. 1-2422 (Va. R, 1939).
40 In addition to strikes, lockouts, and "no contract, no work" controversies, labor dis-
putes have been found in the following situations: (i) slowdowns-Bankston Creek Collieries,
Inc. v. Gordon, 399 Ill. 291, 77 N.E. 2d 670 (I948); 12 B.S. 3-13242 (Ohio R, 1948); (2) con-
troversy over employer's contract violation-Local Union No. ii v. Gordon, 396 Ill. 293,
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labor-dispute disqualification provisions must take the form of legisla-
five, not judicial, activity.
Four acts already include the sensible limitation that no ineligibility
ensues if the dispute is caused by the employer's violation of "any state
or United States law on hours, wages, or other' conditions of work."41
Two of these and one other have extended the same principle to allow
benefits if the work stoppage is due to the "employer's failure to con-
form to the provisions of any contract .... "42
These provisos clearly pass muster on theoretical grounds. And in so
doing, they point the way to the general principle that should underlie
restrictions on the denial of benefits during disputes: Compensation
should be payable during any stoppage of work caused by unreasonable
conduct on the part of the employer.
Adoption of this view would create a distinction in the labor-dispute
section comparable to that found elsewhere in the unemployment com-
pensation acts.4" At the same time, it would conform admirably to all the
theories justifying disqualification. First, the need for "state neutrality"
was grounded on the assumption that it would be too difficult to assess
responsibility for disputes. Where the statute labels conduct as "un-
reasonable" for benefit purposes, the neutrality obstacle is therefore
71 N.E. 2d 637 (1947); Deshier Broom Factory v. Kinney, 14o Neb. 889, 2 N.W. 2d 332
(1942); (3) dispute over employer's failure to comply with War Labor Board directive--cases
cited third paragraph of note 20 supra; (4) dispute between national and local union-Miller
v. UCB of Review, 152 Pa. Super. 315, 31 A. 2d 740 (I943).
Strangely enough, strikes to compel recognition of unions as bargaining agents have twice
been held not to impose disqualification. Duquesne Brewing Co. v. UCB of Review, 359 Pa.
535, 59 A. 2d 913 (1948); Board of Review v. Hix, 126 W.Va. 538, 29 S.E. 2d 618 (i944).
These decisions are inconsistent with such Norris-LaGuardia Act interpretations as that in
United States v. Hutcheson, 3X2 U.S. 219 (1941), with such British decisions as Brit. Ump.
214/26, BU-474 (1926), and with common sense. In fact, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has
already undermined the Duquesne Brewing doctrine in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. UCB
of Review, 68 A. 2d 393 (Pa. Super. Ct., 1949).
4' Arizona, Arkansas, Montana, and Utah statutes cited note 5 supra.
42 Montana, New Hampshire, and Utah statutes cited note 5 supra. The New Hampshire
provision was applied to prevent disqualification in i' B.S. 5-12438 (N.H. R, 1947).
43 For example, disqualification for rejecting new employment extends only to refusal of
"suitable" work. "Suitability" clearly involves a rule of reason, especially since no statute
regards work as suitable "[i]f the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or
other labor dispute; if the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are sub-
stantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in the
locality; if, as a condition of being employed, the individual would be required to join a
company union or to resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor organization."
"Il. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 48, § 223(c)(2). Similarly, not every individual who leaves his work
voluntarily is denied benefits. The concept of reasonableness is injected by excusing voluntary
leaving "with good cause." Kempfer, Disqualifications for Voluntary Leaving and Miscon-
duct, s Yale L.J. 147 (1946).
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automatically removed. Second, it was pointed out earlier that "the ob-
jection to financing strikes loses its impact whenever the shutdown has
resulted from clearly unreasonable conduct on the part of the em-
ployer." The "strike benefits" argument, essentially equitable in its
nature, cannot overcome the equitable answer of "unclean hands" when
the employer himself has caused the stoppage. Finally, if the employees
have by hypothesis been forced to contend with unreasonable opposition
in a dispute, it would be a solecism to term "voluntary" any stoppage,
whether strike or lockout, resulting from breakdown of negotiations.
Unfortunately, the criterion of unreasonableness has never been rec-
ognized as the ultimate objective of statutory modification. In addition,
its translation into specific legislative provisions is not an easy task.
Accordingly, aside from the "breach of contract" and "breach of law"
enactments, few of the present statutory curtailments on "labor dis-
putes" can be rationally defended.
Several acts seek to narrow the basic provision by excluding "lock-
outs" from the disputes that bar benefits4 or by replacing the term
"labor dispute" with "strike."45 Without accompanying definitions the
net result may in some cases amount simply to a trading of one am-
biguity for another.46 And whether or not the terms are defined, a cri-
terion based solely on how the dispute results in a stoppage (by strike
or by lockout) is patently artificial, bearing no logical relevancy to bene-
fit eligibility.
More elaborate attempts have proved just as unsatisfactory. In Con-
necticut,
any individual whose unemployment is due to a lockout shall not be disqualified, un-
less the lockout results from demands of the employees, as distinguished from an effort
on the part of the employer to deprive employees of some advantage they already
possess. 47
44 Arkansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Pennsylvania statutes
cited note 5 supra. One writer has advocated coupling such an exclusion with a provision ex-
cepting lockout benefits from being charged against an employer's experience rating. 33 Minn.
L. Rev. 758, 769 (1949). The idea, though novel, ignores the irrationality of a~y distinction
based on the mere form by which a dispute is translated into a work stoppage.
45 Colorado and Utah statutes cited note 5 supra.
46 Courts in Ohio and Colorado adopted different definitions of "strike" from authoritative
sources and arrived at diametrically opposite conclusions as to the nature of the "no contract,
no work" miners' work stoppages. United States Coal Co. v. UCB of Review, 66 Ohio App.
329, 32 N.E. 2d 763 (1940) (no "strike"); Sandoval v. Industrial Comm'n, ilo Colo. io8, i3o
P. 2d 930 (1942) ("strike").
47 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) § 75o8(3), applied in ii B.S. io-128o8 (Conn. R, 1948).
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The Mississippi labor-dispute section is inapplicable to any employee
who satisfies one condition:
He is unemployed due to a stoppage of work occasioned by an unjustified lockout;
provided, however, such lockout was not occasioned or brought about by such indi-
vidual acting alone or with other workers in concert .... 41
Under the Utah act,
If... a strike has been fomented by a worker, none of the workers of the grade,
class, or group of workers of the individual who is... a party to such plan, or agree-
ment to foment a strike, shall be eligible for benefits ....
If... the employer ... has conspired, planned or agreed with any of his workers
... to foment a strike, such strike shall not render the workers ineligible for benefits.49
All three provisions adopt the unreal strike-lockout distinction. Surely
if it makes good sense to differentiate among lockouts as "justified" and
"unjustified," it must make equally good sense to draw the same line
in other disputes. In the Connecticut act, this error is compounded by
introduction of another fallacious test-that depending on which party
seeks to disturb the status quo. To judge simply by the making of de-
mands, without reference to then-existing economic conditions, would
hinge benefit eligibility on a clear non sequitur. No such sanctity should
be attached to nominally static working conditions.5 °
Only West Virginia has added a significant contribution based on
notions of "unreasonableness":
No disqualification under this subsection shall be imposed if employees are required to
accept wages, hours or conditions of employment substantially less favorable than
those prevailing for similar work in the locality, or if employees are denied the right
of collective bargaining under generally prevailing conditions, or if an employer shuts
down his plant or operation or dismisses his employees in order to force wage reduction,
changes in hours or working conditions.sT
Although the third alternative in the statute is as erroneous as its Con-
necticut counterpart, the first two are sound in theory5" and operate well
in practice.58 They furnish good examples of the type of provision that
will carry out the rationale here suggested and at the same time will
48 Miss. Code Ann. (Supp. 1948) § 7379(e).
49 Utah Code Ann. (i943) § 42-2a-5(d).
so Perhaps because of its relative simplicity of administration, the status-quo criterion was
recommended by Lesser, op. cit. supra note 8, at i8o.
st W.Va. Code Ann. (1943) § 2366(78) (4).
52 See Lesser,'op. cit. supra note 8, at i79; Schindler, op. cit. supra note 14, at 876.
3 Homer Laughlin China Co. v. Hix, 128 W.Va. 613, 37 S.E. 2d 649 (1946); Birchton Coal
Co. v. Board of Review, 7 C.C.H. Unempl. Ths. Rep. 5I,557 (W.Va. C. Ct., 1948); 7 C.C.H.
Unempl. Ins. Rep. 5x,5 84 (W.Va. Board of Review 3516, i949).
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solve the admittedly difficult problem of framing comprehensible, not
overly-vague standards.54
Beyond the draftsmanship barrier, valid objections may be leveled
at the proposed exceptions on administrative grounds. For example, in
many cases the compensation agency's functions would overlap those of
agencies responsible for administering other statutes. Perhaps most com-
mon would be cases in which a Commissioner or Director of Labor and
the NLRB would both be asked to determine whether an employer's
activities constituted a statutory "unfair labor practice." Inconsistent
decisions would be both anomalous and embarrassing; consistent de-
cisions could result in an employee's being awarded unemployment bene-
fits and back pay for the same period of time.55 Furthermore, there
would often be the difficult task of deciding how much weight the benefits
administrator should attribute to another agency's prior decision. 56
Several possible solutions have been offered to these enforcement
problems."" If the difficulties can be minimized-and there seems no
reason to believe that they cannot-the "breach of duty" exceptions
and the desirable portions of the West Virginia act should be added to
whatever else the legislature regards as employer unreasonableness. The
combination would provide a sensible modification of the Draft Bill
section.
THE MEANING OF A ccSTOPPAGE OF WORK"
Most unemployment compensation statutes, following the Draft Bill
provisions, impose disqualification only if a "stoppage of work" exists
S4 The writer's use of "unreasonableness," of course, is intended to indicate an idea rather
than a statutory model. Some notion of the language difficulties inherent in the approach
recommended herein may be derived from the use of the imprecise terms "unjustified" and
"foment" in the quoted Mississippi and Utah provisions.
SSIn Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 318 U.S. 253 (1943), the Supreme Court held that
unemployment "benefits received under the state compensation act were plainly not 'earn-
ings'" within the meaning of a Board order to the employer to reinstate employee victims
of unfair labor practices with back pay, less "net earnings" after the discriminatory discharge.
The earlier decision in Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940), had denied the
Board's power to order employers to reimburse relief agencies for amounts paid to employees
discharged in violation of the NLRA. Since the NLRB is not disposed to allow employers to
shift the economic effects of unfair labor practices to compensation funds, double recovery is
not an uncommon occurrence.
$6 In Members of Iron Workers' Union v. Industrial Comm'n, xo4 Utah 242, 139 P. 2d 208
(z943), an NLRB trial examiner had found the employer guilty of an unfair labor practice
in refusing to bargain. The Utah court denied benefits, stating that it had not been shown that
the alleged unfair labor practice was the cause of the work stoppage. This decision allowed the
court to sidestep the problem of what effect to give the prior holding that the employer had
failed to conform to provisions of a law of the United States.
S7 Lesser, op. cit. supra note 8, at i79-81.
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during the week for which benefits are claimed. Once again a deceptively
simple phrase has proved a continuous source of litigation, both before
the commissions and in the courts.
Like most other aspects of the Draft Bill, the stoppage of work re-
quirement had its origin in the British Unemployment Insurance Acts.
When this country's fifty-one statutes were adopted, the phrase had long
since acquired a settled construction from the British Umpires as refer-
ring "not to the cessation of the workman's labour, but to a stoppage of
the work carried on in the factory, workshop or other premises at which
the workman is employed."-5 It is scarcely surprising that the over-
whelming majority of appellate decisions in the United States have
adopted the same interpretation. 59
Evaluation of this result can best be accomplished by means of an
illustration. In Lawrence Baking Co. v. Michigan UCC,0 the employer
had replaced his striking employees so quickly that only fifteen minutes'
production had been lost. Despite the fact that picketing continued and
the strike was not abandoned, benefits were allowed because there was
no "stoppage of work" at the employer's factory.
At first glance it may seem that such a decision does violence to the
"involuntary unemployment" theory. But the bakers' unemployment,
once the employer resumed production, was involuntary in a very real
sense. Their strike action had been an effort to secure new terms by
means of a temporary suspension of their employment relation. When
they were replaced they lost all possibility of employment with the com-
pany even on their former terms. Their employment relation was not
suspended but terminated. Insofar as employees are thus thrown on the
free labor market when they anticipated no such result from their labor
58 Ministry of Labour, Analytical Guide U. I. Code 7, Part IlI, § 43 (1939 ed.); Brit. Ump.
1480/,927, BU-495 (1927); Brit. Ump. 609, BU-493 (1921).
s9 M. A. Ferst, Ltd. v. Huiet, 78 Ga. App. 855, 52 S.E. 2d 336 (1949); Sakrison v. Pierce,
66 Ariz. 162, I85 P. 2d 528 (,947); Saunders v. Maryland UCB, 53 A. 2d 579 (Md., 1947);
Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. v. Review Board, 1I7 Ind. App. 379, 72 N.E. 2d 662 (1947);
Lawrence Baking Co. v. Michigan UCC, 308 Mich. 198, I3 N.W. 2d 260 (i944); Magner v.
Kinney, 141 Neb. 122, 2 N.W. 2d 689 (942), noted 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 75, (1942); Deshler
Broom Factory v. Kinney, i40 Neb. 889, 2 N.W. 2d 3 3 2 (1942); In re Steelman, 219 N.C. 306,
13 S.E 2d 544 (194x). Contra: Board of Review v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 193
Okla. 36, 141 P. 2d 69 (I943). As the result of a i941 amendment to the Oklahoma statute,
the state now follows the majority rule. o B.S. 11-10992 (Okla. A, i945).
6o 308 Mich. 198, 13 N.W. 2d 260 (x044). The court's task was made more simple by the
fact that prior to 1941 the Michigan statute disqualified workers if their "unemployment is
due to a labor dispute which is actively in progress.. . ." This provision plainly made benefits
contingent on the individual's cessation of work. When an amendment inserted the "stop-
page of work" phrase, it was easy to infer a change in emphasis to the employer's cessation
of work.
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activity, their unemployment is truly "involuntary." The uniformity of
decisions in this area indicates clearly that if the "involuntariness"
theory is at all valid, it must be so on this basis.
On "neutrality" and "strike-financing" grounds the result is equally
understandable. No reasonable man would concede the slightest chance
of success to a strike like that at the Lawrence Baking Company. As an
economic weapon it was impotent. The argument against financing labor
disputes extends logically only to cases in which the financing may re-
sult in the employer's being compelled to submit to the workers' de-
mands. But where production is unimpaired, the unemployed strikers
should be treated no differently than any other unemployed workers.
Nor does the neutrality theory preclude payment of benefits, since the
merits of the dispute can have no impact on the outcome once the strike
is effectively lost.
Despite the cogency of these arguments there has been insistence in
many jurisdictions on satisfying a supposed requirement that not only
the unemployment but the original leaving of work be "involuntary."
Usually this insistence is reflected in statutes which omit the "stoppage
of work" phrase, requiring only that "unemployment [be] due to the
existence of a labor dispute. . . ."" Unfortunately, the same insistence
may also manifest itself in bad decisions under "stoppage of work"
statutes.
Illinois furnishes a fine example of the latter category. In Walgreen
Co. v. Murphy, the state supreme court emphasized the "involuntary
unemployment" theory by stating, "The manifest legislative intent is
that 'stoppage of work' was deemed synonymous with 'strike.' "62 No
confusion should have resulted, for despite this somewhat muddled dic-
tum, other portions of the opinion indicated a real understanding of the
meaning of "stoppage of work":
There was, without question, a stoppage of work at the warehouse resulting from a
labor dispute between the employer and claimant employees, the shutdown substan-
tially interfering with warehouse operations, curtailing them to approximately 20 per
cent of normal production. For all practical purposes, there was a cessation of the
operation of the establishment and a cessation of work. In short, there was both a
stoppage of work and a labor dispute at the warehouse.63
61 This is the language of the Connecticut act. Similar phraseology is found in the Alabama,
Alaska, California, District of Columbia, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nevada,
New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin statutes
cited note 5 supra.
62386 Ill. 32,.36,53 N.E. 2d 3 9 o, 3 93 (1944).
63 Ibid., at 37, 393 (italics added); see Local No. 658 v. Brown Shoe Co., 4o3 11. 484, 87
N.E. 2d 625 (1949); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Durkin, 380 111. 1', 42 N.E. 2d 541 (1942);
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Nevertheless the Illinois administrators have seized on "involuntary un-
employment" and the single sentence first quoted above to adopt the
position that the only stoppage required is that of the individual.64 As a
result, Illinois is one member of a two or three state minority which
adheres to this view. 5
Several problems are presented by the majority criterion of stoppage
at the place of employment. First, the theoretical justifications for the
requirement are plainly applicable even though a complete cessation
of operations does not exist. There has consequently been unanimous
acceptance, both under the British Acts and in this country, of the
proposition that a substantial curtailment is sufficient to disqualify
claimants. 6 Less unanimity exists, of course, as to the meaning of
"substantial." Although most decisions follow the general practice of
examining decreased production,6" business revenue,, service, 69 number
Cuneo Press, Inc. v. Director of Labor, 7 B.S. 9-8785 (Ill. C. Ct., 1944). The Walgreen de-
cision was cited in Sakrison v. Pierce, 66 Ariz. 162, 185 P. 2d 528 (1947), as having established
the employer's stoppage of work as the test for disqualification, thus following the majority
view.
64 12 B.S. 5-13369 (Ill. A, 1948). As early as 1946 one member of the Illinois Division of
Placement and Unemployment Compensation indicated his similar understanding of the
Walgreen case. Hughes, op. cit. supra note io, at 24-25; see 36 11. B.J. 364, 365 (1948),
noting Fash v. Gordon, 398 Ill. 210, 75 N.E. 2d 299 (1947), and expressing the same view.
But see 9 B.S. I-0176 (Ill. R, 1945).
65 Similar mistaken reliance on the "declaration of policy" regarding "involuntary un-
employment" led to the same conclusion in ro B.S. 3-11288 (Colo. R, 1946); see io B.S.
i-xi99o (Tex. A, 1947).
66Cases cited note 59 supra; io B.S. 9-1787 (Me. A, 1946); 5 B.S. 9-7534 (N.D. R,
1941); 5 B.S. 9-7525 (Kan. R, 194); Brit. Ump. 148o/1927, BU-495 (1927); Brit. Ump,
225, BU-49 4 (1921); Ministry of Labour, Analytical Guide U.I. Code 7, Part III, § 46(I939 ed.).
Statutory provisions in two states codify the judicial definition. Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1948) § 9423(q) requires a "substantial diminution of activities, production or service .... "
The North Dakota statute cited note 5 supra refers to a "substantial stoppage of work" with-
out further clarification.
67 Work stoppages have been found when operations were at the following percentages of
normal production: 3 B.S. 8-4132 (Conn. R, i94o) (4o); 9 B.S. 4/5-10500 (Va. R, i945)
(I50o); 4 B.S. 7-6129 (Del. R, 1941) (17%); Walgreen Co. v. Murphy, 386 Ill. 32, 53 N.E.
2d 390 (i944) (20 ); 8 B.S. 11-10025 (Mo.D, 1945) (3o-509); 11 B.S. 2-12217 (N.H. R,
1947) (So%/0); 8 B.S. io-9963 (Wyo. A, 1945) (5o-8o/o); 6 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep. 39,
556 (Okla. App. Trib., 1949) (30-45%); 9 B.S. 6-10547 (Mo. D, 1945) (60o); 12 B.S. 5-
13369 (Ill. A, x948) (80%); 2 B.S. 8-85o (N.J. D, 1939) (8o%, the decision stating that
the continued strike showed the employees' belief that the stoppage was substantial enough to
make strike's success possible); 7 B.S. 4-8483 (Me. D, 19*3) (94% of normal circulation of
struck newspaper held substantial cessation when 25%o of the employees were on strike and
advertising dropped 40%).
In io B.S. 4-11435 (Wash. R, 1946) the employer's counsel argued unsuccessfully that a
i per cent drop in production was a "substantial" stoppage of work in a steel mill because of the
then-existing large backlog of orders.
(See facing page for footnotes 68 and 69)
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of employees, 7 0 payroll, 71 or man-hours,12 seemingly inconsistent results
are bound to ensue from the great variety of fact situations presented.
73
As long as the bases for decision are correct, however, an occasional
aberration is small cause for alarm.
More troublesome has been the question of whether benefits are pay-
able during disputes which cause a substantial production drop in one
department, though not in the entire plant. Twenty-eight of the thirty-
four "stoppage of work" statutes provide that if "separate branches of
work which are commonly conducted as separate businesses in separate
premises are conducted in separate departments of the same premises,
each such department shall, for the purpose of this subsection, be deemed
to be a separate factory, establishment, or other premises.1 74 The impli-
cation is that departments which are not "commonly conducted as sepa-
rate businesses in separate premises" do not possess independent status
for the purpose of determining disqualification. The test should thus be
whether the stoppage was substantial in relation to the entire establish-
69 Employees were disqualified in ii B.S. 7-12598 (Mass. R, 1948) (one-third to ohe-half
decrease in bar's business) and Magner v. Kinney, 141 Neb. 122, 2 N.W. 2d 689 (1942) (30%
drop in total business) but not in 12 B.S. i-i3o31 (Ariz. A, 1948) (one-fourth to one-third
loss in revenue); 4 B.S. 4-5537 (Ill. D, 1940) (one-third decrease in goods billed); 3 B.S.
6-3613 (N.J. D, 1939) (when all current orders were being filled by eight employees out of
original thirty, no work stoppage even though existence of strike caused failure to solicit new
orders); 3 B.S. 3-2894 (Conn. R, i939) (sales greatly reduced because of public sympathy
with strikers, but held no stoppage where hired replacements could have handled ordinary
volume of business).
69 Operation of busses at 8o per cent of usual service did not bar compensation in 3 B.S.
3-2893 (Conn. R, 1939).
70 Substantial stoppages were inferred from the number of employees who left work in
Deshler Broom Factory v. Kinney, i4o Neb. 889, 2 N.W. 2d 332 (1942) (90%); 10 B.S. 8-
11730 (Okla. A, 1946) (75-80%); 10 B.S. 4-11382 (Md. D, 1946) (75%). The opposite de-
cision was reached in 12 B.S. 1-13031 (Ariz. A, 1948) (one-third to one-half reduction);
4 B.S. 4-5538 (Ill. D, 1940) (5-IO% drop); 3 B.S. 8-4z4o (N.J. D, 1939) (i7%); 2 B.S.
2-852 (Conn. R, 1938) (i7%).
71 io B.S. 3-11296 (Ill. R, 1946) (3o% reduction in payroll indicates work stoppage).
72 4 B.S. 2-52II (Conn. R, i94o) (two-thirds decrease in man-hours worked held appreci-
able stoppage). In 7 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep. 49,522 (Va. Comm'r No. 518, 1949), John L.
Lewis' three-day work week was held to have caused a "definite decline in production" and
hence a work stoppage.
73 In 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 751 (1942), noting Magner v. Kinney, 41 Neb. 122, 2 N.W. 2d
689 (1942), the author reviewed the Illinois cases and concluded that 5o per cent of normal
production was the approximate dividing line of "substantiality." Yet subsequent decisions
have disqualified for 20 per cent [12 B.S. 5-13369 (Ill. A, 19.48)] and 3o per cent [io B.S.
3-11296 (Ill. R, 1946)] reductions.
74 All statutes cited in first paragraph of note 5 supra except Delaware, Idaho, Michigan,
Pennsylvania, Utah, and Vermont. Only the West Virginia provision was enacted as a sepa-
rate section rather than as part of the labor-dispute section. W.Va. Code Ann. (1943)
§ 2366(81).
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ment's production, not merely to that of the department in which the
dispute occurred. This approach would be harmonious with the view
that benefits should depend in part upon the likelihood of success of the
employees' strike. However, due perhaps to the pervasive influence of
the "involuntary loss of work" theory, the decisions are in hopeless
conflict.7
5
Several administrators have been faced with the difficult situation
in which the normal production-crippling effect of a strike has been
averted by a temporary work rearrangement by the employer. The
principle of "probable strike success" indicates that decisions should
turn on whether the work can continue permanently on the new basis
or whether the employer will be compelled to rehire to replace the
strikers.70 Once again the decisions are not fully consistent with this or
any other theory,77 and it is fortunate that the problem arises only
infrequently.
7SIn xo B.S. 3-11297 (Ill. R, 1946) claimants argued that cessation of work in the plant
toolroom was not a stoppage of work "in the establishment." The Director of Labor once
again misinterpreted the Walgreen case (see text at notes 62-64 supra) by stating that "the
court held that the existence of a stoppage of work was not to be measured by the effect of a
labor dispute upon the operations of an entire business.... ." Disqualification was caused,
therefore, by a "stoppage of work in the toolroom of the company's establishment." Com-
pare Cuneo Press, Inc. v. Director of Labor, 7 B.S. 9--8758 (Iln. C. Ct., 1944) (5o% stoppage
in one department held "stoppage of work" without further discussion); 4 B.S. 4-.5534 (Conn.
R, i94o) (strike in repair department held work stoppage even though repair work represented
only ij% of total revenue during strike and 8% during previous year); 3 B.S. 8-4145 (N.J.
D, 194o); see Homer Laughlin China Co. v. Hix, 128 W.Va. 613, 37 S.E. 2d 649 (1946) (7s%
curtailment in one department held "stoppage" without discussing problem).
But in 3 B.S. 9-4333 (Mo. D, 194o) the employer met a complete shutdown in the fur-
scraping department by shipping the furs to another locality for'scraping and having them
returned for completion. Since full production was maintained, no stoppage was held to exist.
Compare 5 B.S. 7-7416 (Mass. R, i941), in which half the shipping room employees and
all but one truck driver had gone on strike. Claimants were held disqualified because of the
over-all effect on the business of lack of delivery service, not merely because of the depart-
mental stoppage.
76 Although the British Umpires' decisions include little theoretical discussion, the results
are consistent with the view here suggested. Brit. Ump. 2575, BU-49 6 (1922); Swanish, Trade
Disputes Disqualification Clause under the British Unemployment Insurance Acts 32-33
(1937); Ministry of Labour, Analytical Guide U.I. Code 7, Part III, § 48 (Ig39 ed.). One of
the early American decisions, 2 B.S. 8-1854 (N.J. D, 1939), relied heavily on the British
precedents in reaching a like result.
77 12 B.S. 5-13370 (Ind. A, 1948) involved a strike by 68 compositors of the Hammond
Times's x68 employees. Twenty new employees were hired in the photoengraving and vari-
type departments. Average circulation decreased 2000 copies per issue, but there was no
showing of the reason for the drop or that the newly constituted staff could not handle the
former circulation. Yet benefits were denied because total employment was down (hardly
relevant), circulation was down (not shown to be relevant), and the device adopted was
"temporary." As to the last point, the "temporary" expedient served the entire Chicago news-
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CAUSE AND EFFECT: LABOR DISPUTE AND STOPPAGE OF WORK
Benefit ineligibility is imposed on an employee "for any week [in]
which.., his... unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists
because of a labor dispute... ." The italicized words inject a dual re-
quirement of causality into the statute. Thus it is not sufficient for dis-
qualification that the facts satisfy the definitions of "labor dispute" and
"stoppage of work." Denial of compensation for any week depends on
the additional finding that the stoppage exists because of the dispute
during that week.7
This has not meant the importation of all the complexities of "proxi-
mate cause" doctrine into unemployment compensation. On the con-
trary, the decisions have escaped the difficulties of joint causation,
concurrent causation, and intervening causation79 by adopting the rela-
tively simple "but-for" rule: The work stoppage "exists because of a
labor dispute" only if it would not have existed but for that dispute.
For example, the most common problem involves a stoppage due
initially to a labor dispute. Later another factor appears which would
alone be sufficient to cause a stoppage of work, and benefits are claimed
for subsequent unemployment. Compensation has been uniformly al-
lowed in such cases, whether the new causal element is the employer's
paper-reading public for a twenty-two month period before settlement of the ITU strike. On
appeal, despite its finding that "[plubication of the newspaper continued without interrup-
tion," the Review Board held that a work stoppage existed "in the composing room" (see
note 75 supra) and affirmed the disqualification, 4 8-LDR-4 . The decision is now before the
Appellate Court in Braschler v. Review Board, No. 17943 (1949).
In ii B.S. 10-12848 (N.C. R, 1948) and io B.S. 11-11967 (N.D. A, 1947) administrative
tribunals considered nearly identical telephone operators' strikes during which operations
were maintained by recruiting and borrowing new operators, by using a dial system on local
calls, and by regulating long distance service. The facts were held to show a work stoppage in
North Dakota but not in North Carolina.
78 This plain meaning of the statutes, as stated in Conte v. Egan, 135 Conn. 367, 373, 64 A.
2d 534, 536 (X949), has been followedwith near unanimity: "[Elach week of unemployment is a
severable unit." Only two decisions have been found to adopt a different approach: Johnson v.
Iowa Employment Security Comm'n, 32 N.W. 2d 786 (Iowa, 1948); Employees of Utah Fuel
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 Utah 88, io4 P. 2d 197 (1940). In Employees of Lion Coal Corp.
v. Industrial Comm'n, oo Utah 207, 11i P. 2d 797 (I941) the court, although seeking to dis-
tinguish the Utah Fuel case, reached a decision wholly inconsistent with it.
Since this article went to press, a third court has adopted the highly questionable reasoning
of the Utah Fuel case. Frank Foundries Corp. v. Review Board, 88 N.E. 2d 16o (Ind. App.,
1949)-
79 See generally Prosser, Torts c. 8 (1941); cf. Abramowitz, "Stoppage of Work Due to a
Labor Dispute" as Defined by the Unemployment Compensation Laws, io Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 6o4, 61g (1942).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
decision to close down indefinitely" or to liquidate his business,81 the
end of the normal season in a seasonal business,82 the making of repairs
which would themselves have caused a shutdown,8 3 or the lack of sup-
plies or orders necessary for operation.8"
Precisely the same "but-for" rationale has been applied where the
stoppage was originally produced by nonlabor factors and a labor dis-
pute has arisen during the stoppage. Benefits are consistently paid as
long as the independent cause continues active,85 but disqualification
occurs "for any week" in which the dispute becomes the sine qua non
of the stoppage.8 6 These principles have carried so far as to allow com-
So rI B.S. 1o-12847 (N.C. R, 1948); 9 B.S. 4/5-10481 (N.C. R, I945); 9 B.S. 3-10370
(Mo. D, 1945); 6 B.S. 5-7950 (N.J. D, 1942); 5 B.S. I0-7612 (Mich. A, 1942); 4 B.S. 6-5948
(N.J. D, 1940); 4 B.S. 2-5239 (Wash. A, 1940); 4 B.S. 2-5237 (Va. D, 194o); 3 B.S. 1-2422
(Va. R, 1939); Brit. UImp. 4850/1926, Bu-5o 9 (1926).
Sx 12 B.S. 6-13462 (Mass. A, 1948); 4 B.S. 12-6724 (Kan. D, 1941); 3 B.S. 6-361o (Mo.
D, i94o) (filing of voluntary bankruptcy petition); cf. 3 B.S. 9-4332 (Minn. A, 1940) (sale
of business).
82 1o B.S. 8-1730 (Okla. A, X946) (benefits allowed earlier where drought caused small
tomato crop, thus shortening normal canning season); s B.S. 9-7525 (Kan. R, x941); 4 BS.
12-6726 (Mich. A, 194); 4 B.S. o--6538 (Okla. A, I941); 3 B.S. 5-3370 (Cal. A, 1939).
83 3 B.S. 1-2423 (W.Va. A, 1939). But cf. 12 B.S. 6-13453 (Ky. R, 1948), in which dis-
qualification was imposed during a strike even though the company would have had to shut
down to comply with the state mine inspector's requirements. The decision may be partly
attributed to claimants' failure to indicate the probable duration of such a shutdown.
84 5 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep. 36,532 (N.C. Comm'n 1512, 1949); 4 B.S. 4-5549 (N.J. D,
T940); 3 B.S. 6-3615 (N.J. D, i939); 3 B.S. 6--36o5 (Ind. R, i94o). Contra: Johnson v.
Iowa Employment Security Comm'n, 32 N.W. 2d 786 (Iowa, Z948); Employees of Utah Fuel
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 Utah 88, 104 P. 2d 197 (i94o). The latter two decisions are ex-
plainable by their failure to examine causation for each week of unemployment; see note 78
supra. The same flaw underlies Frank Foundries Corp. v. Review Board, 88 N.E. 2d 16o (Ind.
App., 1949), decided since this article went to press.
8s Tucker v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 55 A. 2d 692 (Md., 1947) (stoppage
caused by lack of materials due to strike at Utah plant of same employer; claimants not dis-
qualified even during subsequent strike in Maryland plant); Muncie Foundry Division v.
Review Board, 1X4 Ind. App. 475, 51 N.E. 2d 891 (I943) (benefits payable despite labor dis-
pute as long as original lack of work persists); Andreas v. Bates, 14 Wash. 2d 322, 128 P. 2d
300 (1942) (scheduled one-week shutdown coincident with dispute does not disqualify);
Camera v. Egan, 2 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep. io,6o6 (Conn. Super. Ct., 1949) (breakdown of
negotiations and closing of department does not preclude benefits when employer had decided
two weeks earlier to close department); 4 B.S. 6-5947 (N.J. D, 194o) (no disqualification for
labor dispute when prior lack of available work caused stoppage); 3 B.S. 1-2422 (Va. R,
1939 (same); 2 B.S. II-2138 (Ind. A, 1939) (same); see Danzer v. UCC, 4 B.S. 2-5235 (Ore.
C. Ct., 1940).
86 Clapp v. Appeal Board, 38 N.W. 2d 325 (Mich., 1949); Abbott v. Appeal Board, 323
Mich. 32, 3 4 N.W. 2d 542 (1948) (labor dispute halted reconversion operation which originally
caused stoppage; benefits denied from time reemployment would have occurred had dispute
not affected reconversion); Andreas v. Bates, 14 Wash. 2d 322, 128 P. 2d 300 (1942) (dispute
disqualifies after original cause of stoppage lapses); Employees of Lion Coal Corp. v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, ioo Utah 2o7, iTI P. 2d 797 (1941); see Muncie FoundryDivision v. Review
Board, T14 Ind. App. 475, 51 N.E. 2d 891 (1943).
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pensation even where the initial cessation of work resulted from the
employer's anticipation of the dispute. 7 In any event, the boundaries of
causation are so well marked out in this area that further discussion is
unnecessary.
CAUSE AND EFFECT: STOPPAGE OF WORK AND UNEMPLOYMENT
Despite the existence of a dispute-caused stoppage of work, any
claimant may qualify for benefits if his unemployment was not caused
by that stoppage. In jurisdictions without the work-stoppage require-
ment, escape from disqualification depends on a lack of causality be-
tween individual unemployment and the dispute itself. Both types of
statute have received essentially the same judicial treatment as that dis-
cussed in the previous section, but certain recurring questions have
called for special treatment.
Primary among these is the "purge" -the removal of disqualification
by taking new employment. Under the British Acts, the labor-dispute
provision is specifically inapplicable if the employee "has ... become
bona fide employed elsewhere in the occupation which he usually fol-
lows, or has become regularly engaged in some other occupation .... 88
The Draft Bills omitted this provision but inserted a reference to labor
disputes at the premises "at which he is or was last employed." Most
courts and administrators 9 have pointed to the word "last" as evi-
dencing legislative intent to approve the "purge" doctrine. The end re-
sult has been a judicial re-enactment of the British exception. Decisions
have insisted that the new work be taken as bona fide permanent em-
ployment with no intent to return to the struck employer after the dis-
pute ends, that the labor dispute be abandoned by the employee upon
accepting new employment, and that there be no evidence of collusion
87 Bryant v. Hayden Coal Co., ii Coo. 9 3 ,1 3 7P. 2d417 (,943) (benefits allowed although
coal mine closed to sink deeper shaft three days prior to contract expiration and expected
stoppage); 5 B.S. 4-7173 (Wash. R, i94o) (mine repairs--same result); 3 B.S. 4-3116 (Ind.
R, i939) (no disqualification where employer had stepped up production in anticipation of
coal mine labor stoppage so that no work was available at time of stoppage).
But cf. Revere Sugar Refinery v. Marshall, io B.S. io-ii86i (Mass. Muni. Ct., 1947),
in which the employer stopped operations to prevent spoilage from a threatened strike. Al-
though the strike occurred a week later, the court sensibly denied benefits from the stoppage
date by holding that the labor dispute was in existence at that time and caused the stoppage.
88 Unemployment Insurance Act, 25 Geo. V, c. 8, § 26(I) (ig35) was in effect at the time
the American statutes were adopted. It has since been replaced by National Insurance Act,
9 & io Geo. VI, c. 67 § 13(l) (1946).
89 Only Missouri has treated this question in detail by statute. Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1948) § 943i 11(a) provides that subsequent employment must be of a permanent nature and
last at least two weeks to terminate labor-dispute disqualification; cf. Minn. Stat. Ann.
(1945) § 268.og subd. i(6).
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with the second employer to attempt to break the causal relation. If
these requirements are met, it is considered of no consequence that the
employee eventually does return to his original employer."' The uni-
versal acceptance of these principles indicates that apparent inconsist-
encies92 are merely the product of variation in the persuasiveness of
claimants.
Another basic problem concerns employees whose discharge or layoff
preceded the disqualifying stoppage. If the discharge is unrelated to the
labor dispute, benefits are always allowed,93 even if the worker subse-
quently fails to cross a picket line to return at the employer's request0 4
or actually joins the pickets." In fact, carried to its logical extreme, the
doctrine has produced the anomalous spectacle of one employee receiv-
ing compensation after his discharge while all other employees are dis-
qualified for having struck to protest that very discharge.9 6 All these
decisions are explainable on a "but-for" basis, the underlying premise
being that the original cause for discharge would continue to cause un-
employment even if the labor dispute were nonexistent.
By the same token, unemployment caused by the employer's or em-
ployee's anticipation of a work stoppage should be noncompensable as
soon as the actual stoppage develops, there being no reason to assume
90 More or less elaborate tests involving varying factors, all of which add up essentially
to the British provision, were formulated in Bergen Point Iron Works v. Board of Review,
137 N.'. L. 685, 61 A. 2d 267 (1948); Mark Hopkins, Inc. v. California Employment Comm'n,
24 Cal. 2d 744, I5i P. 2d 229 ('944); In re Viert, 6 B.S. 8-8097 (Wash. Super. Ct., 1943);
11 B.S. 10-12822 (Ill. R, 1948); 6 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep. 40,507 (Ore. Comm'n 48-C-41,
1948); 2 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep. 5,563 (Ala. Board of Review 1201, 1948); 9 B.S. 9-10835
(Wash. A, 1946); 5 B.S. 10-76o8 (Del. R, 1942).
9x 9 B.S. 11-10987 (N.J. R, 1946).
91 "Purge": 4 B.S. 9-6432 (Ind. R, i94i) (one day); 4 B.S. 3-351 (Mim. A, 194o) (two
days); 5 B.S. 10-76o8 (Del. R, 1942) (two weeks); 4 B.S. 4-5543 (Mass. A, 194o) (same)
4 B.S. 9-6435 (Mich. A, 1941) (seven weeks).
No "purge": 4 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep. 24,536 (Mass. Board of Review X-7zo56, 1948)
(one day); 4 B.S. 12-6725 (Kan. D, 1941) (522 hours); 4 B.S. 7-6135 (N.J. D, i94i) (four
days); 9 B.S. 9--10795 (Ind. R, 1946) (seven weeks).
93 4 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep. 24,566 (Mass. Board of Review X-83o47, 1949); 12 B.S,
8-13589 (Ind. R, 1949); i B.S. 5-12418 (Conn. R, 1947); 9 B.S. ii-0999 (Utah A.
1946); 9 B.S. 9-10777 (Cal. A, i945); 6 B.S. 5-7949 (Mass. R, 1942); 4 B.S. 7-6188 (Ohio
R, i94i); 4 B.S. 7-6133 (Ind. A, 194); 4 B.S. 7-6131 (Idaho A, 1940); 4 B.S. 5-5723
N.J. D, 1940); 4 B.S. 4-5553 (N.Y. A, 1940); 4 B.S. 2-,5209 (Ala. R, 1940); 3 B.S. 8-4133
(Mich. A, 1940); 3 B.S. 7-3858 (Ga. A, 1940).
94 12 B.S. 4-13288 (Kan. R, 1948).
9S 12 B.S. 4-13344 (Tex. R, 1948); 5 B.S. 10-76,7 (N.J. D, 1942); 3 B.S. 6-3608 (Mo. D,
1939); 3 B.S. 4-3131 (Okla. A, 1939); 3 B.S. 4 3114 (Idaho A, 1939); 3 B.S. 3-2897 (N.D.
A, x939); 2 B.S. 10-2o36 (Ind. A, 1939); 2 B.S. 7-1700 (Cal. R, 1939).
9611 B.S. 7-12565 (Conn. R, 1947); 5 B.S. 6-7334 (Mo. D, 194); 4 B.S. 3-5359 (N.Y.
A, 1940). In the Connecticut case, the employees whose firing precipitated the dispute con-
tinued to be paid benefits even though they participated in the strike after their discharge.
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that such employees would not be working in the absence of the dis-
pute."' And no benefits should be paid where an employee is prevented
from returning to work by the existence of a dispute, if his initial un-
employment was a temporary layoff rather than a discharge. 8 Finally,
if a new factor itself sufficient to cause unemployment appears during a
dispute, the mere existence of the dispute does not bar compensation.99
Briefly, then, this second face of the causation coin has also given little
difficulty.
TERMINATION OF DISQUALIFICATION
Only two states set a fixed statutory limitation on the duration of
disqualification.100 Several other acts prescribe a limit by requiring that
the dispute be "still in active progress" in order to deny benefits.' 0 ' But
975 B.S. 6--733r (Iowa R, 194); 4 B.S. 2-5224 (N.J. D, 1940); cf. 2 C.C.H. Unempl.
Ins. Rep. 8,662 (Cal. Appeal Board 5250-10684, 1948) (employee disqualified for quitting
because of desire to be dissociated from impending strike); 5 B.S. 9-7532 (N.J. D, 1942)
(same); 2 B.S. 10-2039 (N.Y. R, 1939) (employee laid off during dispute in anticipation of
shutdown denied benefits; statute requires only "employment lost because of... industrial
controversy. . ."); Brit. Ump. 2736, BU-525 (1922).
Contrary decisions have been reached, but in each case the opinion failed to determine the
right to benefits "for each week," assuming erroneously that unemployment not due in its
inception to a dispute-caused stoppage cannot subsequently change its nature. 3 B.S. 8-4135
(Mo. A, 1940); 3 B.S. 1-2411 (Fla. A, 1939); cf. Ringuette v. UCB, 2 B.S. 12-2249 (R.I.
Super. Ct., 1939).
9 5 B.S. 9-734 (N.D. D, 194); 4 B.S. 6-5954 (Ore. A, 1941); 4 B.S. 3-5350 (Mass. R,
1940); 3 B.S. 1-2414 (Iowa R, 1939); 2 B.S. 6-1557 (Mich. R, 1939); 2 B.S. 2-854 (Conn.
R, 1938); cf. In re Sadowski, 257 App. Div. 529, 13 N.Y.S. 2d 553 (I939).
99 UCC of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143 (946); ro B.S. 12-i2o62 (Ohio R, 1947); 4 B.S.
8-6287 (Neb. D, 1941); 4 B.S. 4-5552 (N.J. D, 1940); 4 B.S. 2-5228 (N.J. D, r94o). But
cf. Echevarria v. Corsi, 273 App. Div. IO46, 78 N.Y.S. 2d 719 (1948), illustrating the un-
wisdom of New York's omission of the "for any week" provision. The employee, who had been
notified on April 4 that she would be laid off on April i i, was held disqualified for seven weeks
because a strike was called on April 7.
On occasion the reasoning of the text has been erroneously employed where the new factor
is not independent but is a direct product of the dispute itself. Thus used, the doctrine becomes
a poor concealment of a predisposition to grant benefits because of vague feelings of "fair-
ness." Bunny's Waffle Shop, Inc. v. California Employment Security Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 735,
151 P. 2d 224 (1944); Department of Industrial Relations v. Drummond, 30 Ala. App. 78,
1 SO. 2d 395 (1941), cert. den. 241 Ala. 142, 1 So. 2d 402 (1941); 9 B.S. 3-10387 (Ohio A,
1945).
200 New York and Rhode Island statutes cited note 5 supra. The repeal of similar limitations
in Alaska, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee shows a clear trend away from such provi-
sions. However, the Report of the Advisory Council on Social Security (Edward R. Stettinius,
Jr., Chairman) to the Senate Finance Committee, S. Doc. 2o6, 8oth Cong. 2d Sess., at 39 (1948),
recommended that a "Federal standard on disqualifications should be adopted prohibiting
states from ... postponing benefits for more than six weeks as the result of a disqualification
except for fraud or misrepresentation."
10,Alabama, Alaska, California, District of Columbia, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin statutes cited
note 5 supra. Compare the Connecticut and New York acts, using different language to reach
the same result.
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in the two-thirds-majority "stoppage of work" statutes, the end of the
disqualification period may be a perplexing problem.
Of course, the breakdown of either of the causal relationships dis-
cussed in the two preceding sections cuts short the disqualification
period. In addition, since the statutes disqualify only for a "stoppage
of work which exists," there has been no question but that termination
of the stoppage accomplishes the same result. Inconsistencies appear,
however, in determining when a work stoppage ends.0 2 For some reason
the decisions have failed to define the stoppage which reinstates in the
same way as the stoppage which disqualifies. The Georgia Court of
Appeals' syllabus in M. A. Ferst, Ltd. v. Huiet is typical: "A stoppage
of work... commences at the place of employment when a definite cur-
tailment in operations occurs by reason of a labor dispute and ends when
such operations are resumed on a normal basis.""3 As a result, a hiatus
between substantial and total revival of production may postpone bene-
fits unreasonably.10 4
Far more significant is the recurring problem of the stoppage of work
that outlives its cause. 05 After the settlement of a steel strike, for ex-
ample, production must await the reheating of the furnaces. Former
strikers apply for compensation on the theory that the labor dispute
has ended. Management argues that no benefits are payable so long as
the causal relation between the dead dispute and the continuing stop-
page remains.
X02 Where the striking employees are quickly replaced without affecting production, the
decisions are necessarily uniform in recognizing the end of the stoppage. Sakrison v. Pierce,
66 Ariz. i62, 185 P. 2d 528 (1947); Lawrence Baking Co. v. Michigan UCC, 308 Mich. i98,
13 N.W. 2d 260 (1944); 12 B.S. 8-13598 (Mass. R, 1949); io B.S. 12-12o44 (Neb. R, 1947);
4 B.S. 7-6128 (Colo. D, 194); 4 B.S. 2-5285 (Ind. A, 194o); 4 B.S. 2-5215 (Mo. D, 194o);
cf. ii B.S. 9-12734 (Ga. R, 1948). The sole exception is found in the few states equating
"stoppage of work" to the individual's unemployment; see notes 64-65 supra.
1' 78 Ga. App. 855, 52 S.E. 2d 336, 337 (1949) (italics added); Radice v. Dept. of
Labor & Industry, 67 A. 2d 313 (N.J. Super. Ct., 1949) ("stoppage" ends when all strikers
replaced); Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. v. Review Board, 117 Ind. App. 379, 72 N.E. 2d 662
(I947); 7 B.S. 2-8378 (Minn. A, 1943); 4B.S. 9-6434 (Md. D, 1941); 4B.S. 8-6286 (Mo. R,
1940); 4 B.S. 6-5958 (Va. R, 1940).
Occasional decisions have leaned too far in the opposite direction. 4 B.S. 1-5024 (Va. D,
1940) (5o% resumption terminates stoppage); 2 B.S. 2-867 (N.C. A, 1938) (approximately
6o%, same).
104 In 7 B.S. 2-8378 (Minn. A, 1943) the disqualification was extended three extra months
by the administrator's failure to apply the "substantial" test at the end of the stoppage as well
as at its beginning.
105 This question, always a source of difficulty, is scheduled for a new run of popularity
as a result of 1949's coal and steel strikes. The time lag between dispute settlement and pro-
duction is virtually an occupational disease of those two industries.
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To date management's victories have been impressive.1 6 But they
have been founded on basic errors. Denial of benefits beyond the end
of the dispute is said to rest on two factors: (i) the long line of de-
cisions under the British predecessors to the "stoppage of work" stat-
utes, all holding claimants ineligible, and (2) the failure of the legis-
latures to adopt provisions limiting disqualification to disputes "in active
progress." Yet, on closer scrutiny, each of these factors is seen to be
wholly irrelevant.
For the most part, it is true that the British acts served as models for
the Draft Bill provisions. In this instance, however, one extremely sig-
nificant difference appears: The British statutes specifically barred com-
pensation "so long as the stoppage of work continues,"0 T while the Draft
Bill expressly omitted that phrase. The reason is simple. The framers
of the Draft Bill had a choice between the British provision and the
early state "active progress" statute and found both unsatisfactory. The
former allowed disqualification to last beyond the end of the dispute;
the latter, lacking the "stoppage of work" requirement, allowed dis-
qualification even though the employer was unaffected by the dispute. 0 8
One answer would have been to insert the "stoppage" language into
the "active progress" mold. The other answer-and the one actually
adopted-was to delete the "so long as . . ." clause from the British
statutory language. It is clear that the authors of the Draft Bill believed
that they were attaining the desired result by the mere deletion. In the
initial 1936 publication of the Draft Bill text, the labor-dispute pro-
vision was summarized by its framers as denying benefits for "[p]artici-
1o6 Saunders v. Maryland UCB, 53 A. 2d 579 (Md., 1947); Carnegie-flinois Steel Corp. v.
Review Board, Iz7 Ind. App. 379, 72 N.E. 2d 662 (1947); 12 B.S. 8-13624 (N.C. R, 1948),
aff'd sub nor. McLaughlin v. Hadley Peoples Mfg. Co. (N.C. Super. Ct., r949); Kroll v.
Chrysler Corp., B8-3 9 62-(I)-942o (Mich. UCC, 1949); 6 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep. 41,737(Pa. Board of Review, 1949); 12 B.S. 4--13349 (W.Va. R, 1948); 12 B.S. 3-r3225 (Neb. R,
1948); ri B.S. ii-r2910 (N.J. R, 1947); 1, B.S. 7-12573 (Del. A, 1947), following 9 B.S.
9-10781 (Del. A, 1946); 10 B.S. 5-11479 (Mich. A, 1946); 1o B.S. 4-i435 (Wash. R,
1946); 7 B.S. 4-8484 (Okla. A, 1943); see American Steel & Wire Co. v. UCB of Review,
x6i Pa. Super. 622, 56 A. 2d 288 (1948). Contra: io B.S. 3-1315 (Mass. R, 1946); 4 C.C.H.
Unempl. Ins. Rep. 28,074 (Mo. R, 1945); 5 B.S. 6-7331 (Iowa R, 1941); cf. Abbott v. Appeal
Board, 323 Mich. 32, 34 N.W. 2d 542 (1948); 12 B.S. 5-13352 (Alaska A, 1948); io B.S. 3-
11332 (Ore. A, 1946).
107 Unemployment Insurance Act, 25 Geo. V, c. 8, § 26(1) (1935), reenacted in National
Insurance Act, 9 & io Geo. VI, c. 67, § I3 (1) (1946). The distinction is briefly noted in Abramo-
witz, op. cit. supra note 79, at 6o8 n. 17.
1o This difference, the real distinction between the so-called "active progress" and "stop-
page of work" type statutes, was recognized and applied by the Michigan Supreme Court in
Lawrence Baking Co. v. Michigan UCC, 3o8 Mich. 198, I3 N.W. 2d 26o (1944); see note 61
supra.
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pation or interest in, or financing of, labor disputes still in progress."'09
A plainer statement could hardly be desired.
Even apart from this and other evidence of actual intent as to mean-
ing, the mere omission of the specific termination provision should lead
to the same conclusion. Where, as here, an enactment deliberately de-
parts from its model, common sense dictates a different interpretation:
It is one of the most ancient, as indeed one of the safest, rules of statutory construction
that where the legislative body adopts the law of another state or country, all changes
in words and phrasing will be presumed to have been made deliberately and with a
purpose to limit, qualify, or enlarge the adopted law as the changes in the words and
phrases imply.1°
Yet this persuasive combination of real and presumed legislative intent
has not prevailed, simply because the courts have been totally unaware
of it. Illustrative of the misinformation and lack of information which
have led to the present "majority view" is the Maryland Supreme
Court's reference to the clearly different British act as "practically
identical with our statute.""'
Such decisions are even more puzzling in light of the statutes' usual
justifications. "Neutrality" demands nonpayment of benefits during a
dispute. After peaceful settlement of a dispute, the need for "neutrality"
of that kind ends, and continued benefit denial would be decidedly un-
neutral. Similarly, the "strike financing" argument is totally irrelevant
in determining compensation for a period after the strike has ended.
Finally, the workers' unemployment between the end of the strike and
the end of the stoppage is scarcely "voluntary" in the same sense as
unemployment during the strike. Since each week should be examined
separately in determining eligibility, none of these theories requires
disqualification after the termination of the dispute. In the absence of
better-informed decisions, however, the unreasonable trend continues.
lo9 Social Security Board, op. cit. supra note 4, at iii (1936); cf. BU, at 21 (1938); Social
Security Board, Social Security in America 125 (1937).
110 Whittlesey v. Seattle, 94 Wash. 645, 652, 163 Pac. 193, 195 (,917), quoted and followed
in In re Eaton's Estate, 170 Wash. 280, 6 P. 2d 433 (1932); Baker v. Fraser, 209 Ark. 932,
194 S.W. 2d 131 (1946); Walker v. Wedgwood, 64 Idaho 285, i3o P. 2d 856 (1942); Chicago
Corp. v. Munds, 2o Del. Ch. 142, 172 At. 452 (1934); Richmond v. Moore, i07 Ill. 429, 434
(1883); 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 5209, at 554 (3d ed. Horack, 1943).
"' Saunders v. Maryland UCB, 53 A. 2d 579 (Md., i947). In American Steel Foundries v.
Gordon, 88 N.E. 2d 465 (Ill., 1949), the Illinois Supreme Court followed this quotation with
the comment, "The Maryland Act is, in turn, practically identical with the Illinois act." The
Illinois court's decision is the first to reject all the arguments presented in this article.
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THE MEANING OF "FACTORY, ESTABLISHMENT OR OTHER PREMISES"
Nearly every statute limits the denial of benefits to labor disputes at
the "factory, establishment or other premises" at which the claimant was
employed." 2 In this phrase too, the apparent simplicity of statutory lan-
guage has often been obscured by application of divergent theories.
The predecessor British acts referred to a "factory, workshop or other
premises,""' 3 clearly establishing a test of geographic proximity. "Two
factories belonging to the same employer but in different towns would,
of course, be separate premises.""' 4 Consequently the only borderline
cases involved the problem of how small to draw the circle of physical
proximity." 5
When the Draft Bill adopted and Americanized the phrase by substi-
tuting "establishment" for "workshop," the decisions reached should
have been identical. But the first two cases to come before the courts
involved statutes referring only to the "establishment" at which the dis-
pute occurred. Both the Wisconsin and Michigan Supreme Courts re-
jected the sole criterion of physical proximity, arguing instead that a
single "establishment" depended on "functional integrality" regardless
of the distance between separate units." 6 Since that time a battle has
been waged between the English interpretation and an incorporation of
the broad construction of "establishment" into the "factory, establish-
ment or other premises" terminology.
Several arguments display the untenable character of the latter choice.
First, a logical application of the "functional integration" test would
disqualify workers unemployed due to a dispute in a separate installation
owned by a totally different employer. Yet no decision has been willing
to distort "establishment" to that extent." 7 Second, the controlling term
112 Only a few acts deviate from the quoted Draft Bill formulation. The Alabama, California,
District of Columbia, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island, and Wiscon-
sin statutes cited note 5 supra refer only to "establishment." The Utah act speaks of "factory
or establishment." Texas, although employing the usual trio, specifically includes "vessel."
Idaho is the only jurisdiction having no comparable provision.
23 Unemployment Insurance Act, 25 Geo. V, c. 8, § 25(2) (1935).
114 Ministry of Labour, Analytical Guide U.I. Code 7, Part III, § I i8 (i939 ed.).
11S Ibid., at §§ ii8-i; Brit. Ump. 4943/1926, Bu-572 (1926); Brit. Ump. 1807/26, BU-574
(1926); Brit. Ump. 5.568, BU-589 (1923); Brit. Ump. 392, BU-575 (1921).
116 Spielman v. Industrial Conm'p, 236 Wis. 240, 295 N.W. i (i94o) (Nash plants 4o miles
apart held one establishment); Chrysler Corp. v. Smith, 297 Mich. 438, 298 N.W. 87 (1941)
(nine Dodge plants constituted single establishment though claimants' plant was ii miles
from main plant).
217 Kalamazoo Tank & Silo Co. v. Michigan UCC, 324 Mich. io, 36 N.W. 2d 226 (i949);
ii B.S. 9-12780 (Ohio R, 1947); 11 B.S. 9-12738 (La. A, 1947); 4 B.S. 6-5955 (Ore. A,
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for the application of ejusdem generis principles is "factory," not "es-
tablishment,"" 8 as seen by comparison with the parent British act.
"Establishment," like "workshop," was intended to mean only a place
of business which could not qualify as a "factory." As stated by the
Illinois Supreme Court, "The words 'establishment' and 'premises' em-
ployed in Section 7 (d) are so commonly understood as units of place
that further definition is superfluous."" 9 Finally, to adopt the "inte-
gration" test would effectively delete the entire limiting phrase from the
statute, thus amounting to an unwarranted judicial amendment. Cer-
tainly claimants would not be in the position of applying for unemploy-
ment benefits if a close degree of functional integrality did not exist
between their plant and the struck plant. 20
Nevertheless the struggle continues, with the argument even made
(unsuccessfully) that employees may be disqualified although thousands
of miles from any dispute.' 2' The criterion of "integration" alone should
be flatly rejected as a solution. If the intended geographic test is attacked
as unsatisfactory, such complaints are for the legislature.122
1941); 2 B.S. 7-1703 (N.Y. A, 1939); 2 B.S. 4-1250 (Wis. A, 1938); see Tennessee Coal,
Iron & R. Co. v. Martin, 33 Ala. App. 502, 36 So. 2d 535 (1948), aff'd 251 Ala. 153, 36 So. 2d
547 (r948).
118 General Motors Corp. v. Mulquin, 134 Conn. 118, 55 A. 2d 732 (1947).
119 Walgreen Co. v. Murphy, 386 Ill. 32, 39, 53 N.E. 2d 390, 394 (x944). The Walgreen
language was approved and followed in Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Martin, 251 Ala.
153, 36 So. 2d 547 (1948), in which the court rejected the "integrality" formula under a statute
which referred only to the "establishment" at which claimants were employed.
rso Eligibility for Unemployment Benefits of Persons Involuntarily Unemployed because
of Labor Disputes, 49 Col. L. Rev. 550, 558 (i949); 36 111. L. Rev. 58I, 584-85 (1942), noting
Chrysler Corp. v. Smith, 297 Mich. 438, 298 N.W. 87 (I94i).
12' Tucker v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 55 A. 2d 692 (Md., 1947) (Utah strike
caused layoffs 2000 miles away in Maryland); 4 B.S. 2-5213 (Mass. A, i94o) (longshoremen's
strike iooo miles away caused claimant's unemployment); 3 B.S. 5-3379 (S.C. Op. Counsel,
1939) (same). Counsel for the FordMotor Company have argued before compensation officers
all over the country that the "Ford Empire" was a single "establishment" so as to disqualify
all Ford employees thrown out of work by the May 1949 strike at the Dearborn plant. This
contention was almost universally rejected, as in 3 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep. 20,555 (Ky.
Referee, 1949); 5 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep. 33,6IO (N.J. Board of Review BRL-Si-i,
1949); 7 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep. 51,584 (Va. Comm'n 466-C, 1949); 4 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins.
Rep. 24,569 (Mass. Board of Review X-866oo-A, 1949).
Other cases holding that no dispute existed at the geographic establishment are General
Motors Corp. v. Mulquin, 134 Conn. i18, 55 A. 2d 732 (i947) (18 miles from struck plant),
followed in 12 B.S. 3-13204 (Conn. R, 1948); 4 B.S. 4-556o (Wash. A, Ig4o) (5o miles);
2 B.S. 9-1972 (N.J. D, 1939) (Rhode Island strike caused New Jersey stoppage).
Single "functional establishments" were the bases for disqualification in 6 C.C.H. Unempl.
Ins. Rep. 38,532 (Ohio Board of Review 1127-BR-48, 1948); 12 B.S. 5-3404 (N.Y. R, 1948)
(three miles apart); ii B.S. X-12123 (Mo. A, 1947) (I-iS blocks); 6 B.S. 6-8007 (Ohio R,
1942) (different cities); 4 B.5. 3-5361 (Wash. A, 194o) (3 blocks).
- Compare Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) § 7508(3) (disqualification if unemployment due to
dispute at another installation operated by claimant's employer within state); Mich. Stat.
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APPLICATION OF THE "SEPARATE BRANCH OF WORK" PROVISION
Often confused with the phrase just discussed, but serving a wholly
different function, is the "separate branch of work" clause contained in
nearly three-fourths of the statutes. Instead of basing exemption on
geographic separation, this provision applies to (I) separate branches
of work (2) carried on in separate departments (3) at the same prem-
ises. If the branch of work is of a type ordinarily carried on as a sepa-
rate business in separate premises, the erhployee is regarded as working
at a "separate factory, establishment, or other premises.' 123
Explanation of this proviso is refreshingly simple. It regards as pri-
marily accidental the fact that the claimants who conform to its require-
ments may happen to work on the premises of a struck plant. Accord-
ingly, it excepts them from disqualification. 24 Similarly, if a dispute
Ann. (Supp. 1947) § 17-531(b); Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1947) § 126-705(d) (allpreniises
operated by employer to be considered one if dispute at one disturbs operations at others).
Special problems would still receive proper treatment under the text approach. Thus all
the docks in a struck area would be considered one "establishment" or "premises" because of
the longshoremen's hiring hall arrangement: Matson Terminals, Inc. v. California Employ-
ment Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 695, I5I P. 2d 202 (1944); o B.S. 3-11333 (Ore. A, z946); Brit.
Ump. 1953/25, BU-481 (1925). And the mere fact that bargaining is placed on a nationwide
basis should not negative a dispute at the individual plants: Brit. Ump. 1263, BU-462 (1921);
Brit. Ump. 351, BU-461 (1925); cf. UCC of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143 (1946). But cf.
i B.S. 2-12X91 (Ill. R, 1947), purporting to apply the geographic proximity test to allow
benefits to coal miners because no negotiations were being carried on at their individual mine.
U3 The reference in this proviso to separate departmehts at the same "premises" rather than
at the same "factory, establishment, or other premises" tends to substantiate the argument
that an "establishment" depends on geographic proximity. The term "premises" admittedly
sets up a geographic limitation. If "establishments" were defined to reflect functional inte-
grality, the "separate branch" provision would operate in an irregular and inconsistent fashion,
relieving ineligibility in some "establishments" (those on the same "premises") but not in
others (those physically separate but functionally integrated). Compare 5 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins.
Rep. 33,610 (N.J. Board of Review BRL-8x5-i, 1949).
124 Hughes, op. cit. supra note io, at 96-io4 discusses at length the question whether the
proviso serves as an automatic exemption from the labor-dispute section or whether it simply
modifies the "grade or class" provision discussed infra at p. 332. Since the former interpreta-
tion was firmly established as proper under the British statute, and since the British wording
was adopted verbatim by the Draft Bill, there seems little reason to deviate from the estab-
lished construction because of any paragraphing or punctuation differences in the American
acts.
In any event, most statutes specify that the "separate branch" provisos apply "for the
purposes of this section," implying that they are not intended solely to modify the "grade
or class" provision. The mere fact that the clause is sometimes inserted in an ambiguous posi-
tion in the statute (see Illinois act quoted in text at note 5 supra, North Dakota, Tennessee,
and Wyoming acts) should not lead to any other conclusion. Several other statutes (Florida,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshi;re, New Mexico, Texas, and Hawaii)
increase the uncertainty by their format, but only two acts (New Jersey and Washington)
specifically restrict the provision to its narrower scope. In such jurisdictions the claimant who
has proved himself within the "separate branch" clause must also show that he is not partici-
pating, financing, or directly interested; cf. Wicklund v. Comm'r, 18 Wash. 2d 2o6, 138 P. 2d
876 (1943).
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causes a substantial stoppage of work in a department of the "separate
branch" type though not in the entire plant, consistent application of the
proviso requires denial of benefits to the employees in that depart-
ment.125
Very little difficulty has been occasioned in applying this exception
once its area of operation has been understood. Most decisions have
hinged on whether the work is "commonly" conducted as a separate
business in separate premises,'26 and there have been few hard cases
to make the proverbial bad law. In short, further discussion would be
unprofitable.
II. THE EXCEPTION-ESCAPE FROM INELIGIBILITY
At this point every element necessary for disqualification has been
encountered. But a statute that stopped here would violate every theory
advanced to justify denial of benefits during disputes. Blanket disquali-
fication would affect many whose unemployment was unquestionably
involuntary; it would abandon the state's neutral position and assume
a punitive aspect as to employees not involved in the dispute; it would
preclude payment of compensation that could in no way be termed
"strike benefits."
Most jurisdictions have essayed solution of this problem by granting
relief to any claimant who can show (i) that he is not "participating in,
I's Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Durkin, 38o Ill. 1I, 42 N.E. 2d 541 (1942); see Walgreen Co.
v. Murphy, 386 Ill. 32, 53 N.E. 2d 390 (1944). The Indiana Employment Security Division
Review Board recently applied the proviso to reach a like result, denying benefits to com-
posing room employees numbering 5 per cent of a printing plant's total complement. There
was a substantial stoppage in the composing room, though not in total plant production.
The Review Board stated without discussion or explanation that the composing room came
within the "separate branch" clause. The decision, 48-LDR- 3, has been appealed to the Ap-
pellate Court. Blakely v. Review Board, No. 17944 (1949). A major ground of dispute between
the parties is whether the "branch of work" involved is that of the "composing shop" (many
of which are separate establishments) or the "composition shop furnishing type to a daily news-
paper" (none of which are separate establishments).
12 The proviso has been employed in these cases: Wicklund v. Comm'r, z8 Wash. 2d 2o6,
138 P. 2d 876 (1943) (railroad as part of logging operations); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Durkin,
380 Ill. 11, 42 N.E. 2d 541 (1942) (pattern shop in tractor factory); ir B.S. 9-12780 (Ohio R,
1947) (railroad operations wholly on premises of tube manufacturing company); io B.S. I-
11144 (Mass. R, 1946) (foundry in machine works); 8 B.S. io-9961 (W.Va. A, 1945) (same);
2 B.S. i--2238 (Ark. A, i939) (sawmill near manufacturing plant); 2 B.S. 8-i858 (S.C. Op.
Counsel, 1939) (company store near textile mill); 2 B.S. 5-x428 (Ore. A, 1938) (upholstering
department in furniture factory).
It has been held inapplicable in 12 B.S. 6-13470 (N.Y. A, 1948) (seamen's operations in
vessel stopped by cooks' and stewards' strike); 12 B.S. 1-i3030 (Ariz. A, 1948) (meat markets
in food stores); 4 B.S. 4-5538 (Ill. D, 194o) (metal bedspring department in bed factory);
4 B.S. 3-5361 (Wash. A, 194o ) (cab shop in truck manufacturing plant); 3 B.S. 4-3119
(Mass. A, 1939) (single department in production line operation); 2 B.S. 12-2255 (XV.Va. A,
1939) (dry-cleaning plant in building adjacent to laundry).
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financing, or directly interested in" the labor dispute and (2) that he
is not a member of a "grade or class" of employees, any of whom are
engaging in any of those activities. 27 Thus four more undelineated con-
cepts have been added further to complicate the benefit question.
"PARTICIPATING" IN A LABOR DISPUTE
In the ordinary case an individual's status as a "participant" in the
labor dispute offers no difficulty. If he leaves work in concert with
the other employees at the inception of a strike, if he takes part in a
concerted slowdown, if he pickets the struck plant, or if he refuses to
continue his work during a dispute that would not otherwise affect him,
his conduct clearly amounts to participation. Other and varied activities
such as acting as a union observer, 28 refusing to handle "hot goods," 2 9
and securing a union permit to work during a strike13° have also been
termed "participation" in the dispute.' 31
By all odds the most troublesome situation, and hence that most often
before the courts, involves the failure of nonstrikers to cross a picket
line. Since such employees are by hypothesis nondisputants, no vio-
lence would be done the theory of state neutrality by paying them bene-
fits. For the same reason their receipt of compensation could not be
called "strike financing." It is not surprising, then, that decisions have
ordinarily based the right to payment on the "voluntary" or "involun-
tary" nature of their failure to cross:
They were unemployed solely because, in accordance with their union principles, they
did not choose to work in a plant where certain of their fellow employees were on
127 Only the Alabama, California, Delaware, Kentucky, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, and
Wisconsin statutes cited note 5 supra fail to grant a similar exception.
'2"3 B.S. 9-4337 (N.J. R, 1940); 2 B.S. 9-1976 (R.I. D, 1939).
129 In 9 B.S. ri-10973 (Mass. R, 1946) this was properly held participation although the
claimant's employment contract provided that he would not be compelled to handle struck
work.
13o In re Persons Employed at St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 7 Wash. 2d 58o, io P. 2d
877 (1940; 7 B.S. 2-8379 (Ohio A, 943).
131 Mere union membership has sometimes been the basis for a finding of "participation."
9 B.S. 2-10233 (Ark. D, i945); 4 B.S. zo-654o (Ore. A, 1945); 3 B.S. 2-2710 (Wash. A,
1939); 3 B.S. 1-2413 (Ind. R, 1939). However, such a doctrine is subject to grave abuse. In
the Indiana case the claimant was eleven months in arrears in union dues, refused to quit at
the strike call and finished his shift, and disregarded the union's order that he picket. Yet, be-
cause he had never notified the union that he was no longer a member, he was held a partici-
pant.
Union membership alone is very slight, if any, evidence of actual dispute participation.
Since membership may be of considerable relevance in showing "direct interest" and since
the claimant bears the burden of disproving both elements, the union card should be dis-
regarded on this issue.
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strike. Their own consciences and faith in their union principles dictated their action.
This choice is one which members of organized labor are frequently called upon to
make, and in the eyes of the law this kind of choice has never been deemed involun-
tary.132
No complaint is ordinarily made as to the voluntary-involuntary
dichotomy as such. 33 Thus where crossing is prevented "because of
the militant attitude of the picket line, because of incidents of violence,
and because of threats of physical violence," 3 4 claimants' action is
clearly involuntary. Where an alleged fear of violence is demonstrably
justifiable, decisions again properly hold that there has been no "par-
ticipation."' 35 Where the police prevent any crossing'36 or the employer
locks the plant gates to avert possible violence,'3 7 no finding of partici-
pation is made.
Some applications of the rule, however, are startling in their naIvet.
These are the cases which overlook the coercive aspects of picketing and
regard it solely as an innocuous form of publicizing. Because employees
have a "legal right" to cross a picket line, 3 ' these decisions impose an
excessive burden of proof on the claimant who alleges that his conduct
was impelled by a fear of violence.3 9 Although it is easy for a court to
proclaim that "courts must presume that strikers are law-abiding [so
'32 Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Comm'n, 17 Cal. 2d 321, 327-28, Iog P.
2d 935, 94o (1943), followed in Matson Terminals, Inc. v. California Employment Comm'n,
24 Cal. 2d 695, IS P. 2d 202 (i944). Although the California statute contains no specific
exceptions to disqualifications, judicial construction has effectively inserted several by adopting
the test of "involuntary unemployment."
133 Of course work must be available to the employee if he does cross the picket line. If his
attempt to cross would be futile, even an outright refusal could not lend any additional
strength to the strikers and should not be held participation. 4 B.S. 12-6730 (N.J. D, 1941);
4 B.S. 3-5361 (Wash. A, 1940); 4 B.S. 2-5217 (Mo. D, 1940); 2 B.S. 3-1079 (Ore. A, 1938).
134 McGann v. UCB of Review, 163 Pa. Super. 379, 62 A. 2d 87 (948); il B.S. 11-12895
(I11. R, 1947); Brit. Ump. 1764/25, BU-613 (1925); Brit. Ump. 1677/25, BU-49 2 (1925).
13S "A non-striker's fear of injury must be real and substantial and not nebulous." McGann
v. UCB of Review, 163 Pa. Super. 379, 385, 62 A. 2d 87, 90 (1948); Steamship Trade Ass'n of
Baltimore v. Davis, 57 A. 2d 8x8 (Md., 1948); 10 B.S. 7-1625 (Hawaii R, i947); 9 B.S.
12--11012 (Cal. R, 1946); 5 B.S. 10-7622 (Pa. A, 1942); 5 B.S. 9-7531 (N.J. D, 1942);
4 B.S. 11-6639 (Minn. A, 194).
131 5 B.S. 6--7336 (N.J. D, I941).
'37 Outboard, Marine & Mfg. Co. v. Gordon, 403 I1. 523, 87 N.E. 2d 61o (i949); 9 B.S.
12-11013 (Cal. R, 1946).
138 In re Persons Employed at St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 7 Wash. 2d 58o, 595, 1io P.
2d 872, 884 (1941).
139 Ibid.; Yahrling v. Board of Review, ii B.S. i2-13o9 (W.Va. C. Ct., 1948); 5 B.S.
7-7416 (Mass. R, 1941) (threats of violence held insufficient).
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that there] must be more than a mere theatrical threat of violence,"14
most workers (and most judges) would hesitate to risk serious injury
on a pure guess whether a threat was "theatrical" or not. No finding of
participation ought to be made without truly objective grounds: the
failure to use available police protection, 4' the failure to cross where
others have done so without mishap,'42 a prior indication by the em-
ployee's union of its decision not to cross the picket line,' 43 or a total
absence both of violence and threats of violence.'4
Several cases have required even more, holding that the employer has
an affirmative duty to provide safe ingress and egress 45 or that physical
violence is the natural result of any attempt to go through a picket
line.'46 It is also easy to go too far in this direction, for refusal to cross
necessarily involves the exertion of additional economic pressure on the
employer, and enhances a strike's chances of success. With neither ex-
treme satisfactory, the objective test proposed above offers the best
solution to the picket-line "participation" question.
140 Steamship Trade Ass'n of Baltimore v. Davis, 57 A. 2d 8x8, 820 (Md., 1948).
141 IO B.S. 4-11389 (Mo. A, 1946); o B.S. 12-11017 (Cal. R, 1946).
'42 Baldassaris v. Egan, 68 A. 2d 120 (Conn., 1949); cases cited note 141 supra. In Yale &
Towne Mfg. Co. v. Lanyou, 2 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep. IO,623 (Conn. Super. Ct., i949), the
court applied this criterion in skillful fashion to disqualify claimants during one part of a strike
and allow benefits during another.
'43 Phillips v. UCB of Review, 163 Pa. Super. 374, 62 A. 2d 84 (1948); Brown v. Maryland
UCB, 55 A. 2d 696 (Md., 1947); 7 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep. 5o,59o (Wash. Appeal Examiner
A-I4 3 6I, 1949); 12 B.S. 2-13120 (Alaska A, 1948); 5 B.S. 4-7160 (Ill. D, 94I).
144 Stillman v. UCB of Review, x6x Pa. Super. 569, 56 A. 2d 380 (1948); Appeals of Em-
ployees of Pacific T. & T. Co., 198 P. 2d 675 (Wash., 1948); 4 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep. 24,266
(Mass., Board of Review X-70407, I949); 3 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep. 17,529 (Ind. Review
Board 48-LDR-6, r949); 12 B.S. 7-13527 (Mass. R, 1949); 11 B.S. Io-i2817 (Fla. R, 1948);
ii B.S. 7-12598 (Mass. R, X948); ii B.S. 1-12123 (Mo. A, 1947); 9 B.S. 12-11042 (Kan.
R, 1946); 5 B.S. 1o-7614 (Minn. A, 1942); 5 B.S. 9-7523 (Ga. A, 1942); 5 B.S. 6-7329
(Ga. D, 194); 5 B.S. 4-767 (N.J. D, 1941); 4 B.S. 2-5234 (Ore. A, i94o); cf. Meyer v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 4 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep. 28,629 (Mo. App., 1949).
'4s Kalamazoo Tank & Silo Co. v. Michigan UCC, 324 Mich. 101, 36 N.W. 2d 226 (i949).
Even though seventeen employees had gone through the picket line, the court found a reason-
able cause to fear bodily harm. It then excused failure to cross because the company's presi-
dent had not carried out his promise to secure an injunction or police protection. Compare
io B.S. I1-1I998 (W.Va. A, 1947).
146"[Tihe term 'peaceful picketing' is pretty much of a myth. About the only peaceful
picket is an unconscious one.... ." io B.S. 11-11998 (W.Va. A, 1947), rev'd Yahrling v.
Board of Review, ii B.S. 12-3oi9 (W.Va. C. Ct., 1948); io B.S. 7-11625 (Hawaii R,
1947); 5 B.S. 4-7164 (Neb. D, 1941); 5 B.S. 1-6871 (Neb. D, 1941) (employee "under
no obligation to risk possible personal injury or to jeopardize his friendly relations with other
workers as a prerequisite to qualifying for unemployment compensation"); cf. 4 B.S. 4-5542
(Kan. R, 1940); 3 B.S. 1-2413 (Ind. R, 1939); 3 Miami L.Q. 320 (1949), noting Appeals of
Employees of Pacific T. & T. Co., 198 P. 2d 675 (Wash., 1948).
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cFINANCING"' A LABOR DISPUTE
Disqualification for "financing" a dispute has been virtually a dead
letter in the United States. Eleven jurisdictions differ from the Draft
Bill by omitting the word entirely from the "participating-financing-
directly interested" combination, 47 and three others have specific pro-
visions that "financing" does not include payment of regular union
dues. 48 Only a single appellate court and a handful of administrative
tribunals have been called upon to define "financing."
Under the British acts "[e]very member of a trade union who ordi-
narily subscribes to, and thereby has a proprietary interest in, its funds
is himself financing the dispute if the trade union is doing so."' 49 This
construction applied to the American statutes would contradict every
theoretical basis for labor-dispute disqualification. It would deny bene-
fits to workers who are involuntarily unemployed and who have no
interest in the outcome of the dispute, so that compensation payment
would not be unneutral. Furthermore, the level of maximum benefit pay-
ments insures that benefits will be used to support the unemployed and
their families and not diverted to financing the strike.
Accordingly, judicial desertion of the British precedents seems quite
justifiable. Courts may readily employ the time-honored ground that
adopted statutes bring with them their settled interpretations only when
the latter are consistent with the public policy of the importing juris-
diction.' 50 However, the mere presence of the provision is potentially
dangerous, and it has on occasion imposed disqualification.' 5 The vari-
ation from the Draft Bill already referred to should meet more wide-
spread legislative approval so as to clarify the situation completely.
147 Alaska, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee statutes cited note 5 supra. The Idaho
and South Carolina acts except "financing" from their "grade or class" provisos.
X48 Florida, Massachusetts, and Michigan statutes cited note 5 supra.
149 Ministry of Labour, Analytical Guide U.I. Code 7, Part III, § 97 (I939 ed.); Brit. Ump.
823/36 (1936); Brit. Ump. 13/25, BU-627 (1925).
ISo Most decisions denying a claim of "financing" make their task easier by simply ignoring
the British construction. Outboard, Marine & Mfg. Co. v. Gordon, 403 Ill. 523, 87 N.E. 2d
61o (i949) ($45 inter-union payment every three months); 9 B.S. 12-11o63 (Mo. D, 1946)
(no "financing" although strike benefits paid out of union funds); 4 B.S. 2-5236 (Va. D,
1940).
'S' 1o B.S. io-xi867 (Neb. R, 19 46); 4 B.S. 12-674o (Wyo. A, i9 41); 4 B.S. 2-5234 (Ore.
A, i94o); 3 B.S. 6-3621 (W.Va. A, i94o); 3 B.S. 2-2710 (Wash. A, 1939); 2 B.S. 1-739
(Conn. R, 1938); cf. 3 B.S. i-24o9 (Fla. A, I939). These decisions are hard to reconcile with
the optimistic view expressed in Eligibility for Unemployment Benefits of Persons Involun-
tarily Unemployed because of Labor Disputes, 49 Col. L. Rev. 55o, 56I (1949): "Although the
original English provision still appears in a majority of American statutes, there can be little
doubt that it will not be held applicable to the mere payment of union dues."
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AND "LABOR DISPUTES"
"DIRECTLY INTERESTED" IN A LABOR DISPUTE
Nonparticipants in a labor dispute (considering "financing" as a type
of participation) may nevertheless have disqualification imposed on
them in nearly all jurisdictions on the basis of their "direct interest"
in the dispute. 152 Denial of compensation because of the claimant's
"interest" is apparently based on dual grounds: (i) Limiting disquali-
fication to participants would allow evasion of the statutory provisions
by a careful choice of key "participants," thus exerting the same eco-
nomic pressure on the employer while most of the real parties in interest
collected benefits. (2) Payment to "interested" employees might disturb
the state's hypothetical "neutrality."
These theories in combination are adequate to explain disqualification
of employees who will receive benefits from a successful resolution of
the dispute. Naturally, most of the cases have involved this type of
situation, with the subject matter of the controversy affecting claim-
ants' wages, 5 3 hours,'54 seniority,' 55 grievance procedure, 15 bargaining
rights,' 5 or vacation rights. 58 Since "direct interest" is tested solely by
the possible effect of the dispute and is independent of the "financing"
and "participating" provisions, it is of no importance that the claimant
is a nonunion member or that his unemployment is unquestionably in-
voluntary.159
"S2 Tenn. Code Ann. (Supp. I948) § 69 oI.2 9E requires for relief from disqualification only
that the claimant and members of his grade or class be nonparticipants. This statute and
judicially-created amendments to the standard statutory provision (see text at notes 17o-72
infra) are the only exceptions to the "direct interest" rule. In fact, La. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Supp.
1947) § 443 4.4(d) disqualifies if an employee is merely "interested."
"s3 Kemiel v. Review Board, 17 Ind. App. 357, 72 N. E. 2d 238 (x947); Auker v. Review
Board, ir7 Ind. App. 486, 71 N.E. 2d 629 (1947); Chrysler Corp. v. Appeal Board, 3oi Mich.
351, 3 N.W. 2d 302 (942), cert. den. 317 U.S. 635 (r942), following Chrysler Corp. v. Smith,
297 Mich. 438, 298 N.W. 87 (I94); Huiet v. Boyd, 64 Ga. App. 564, 13 S.E. 2d 863 (i94i);
Ahrens v. Gordon, 3 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep. i6,581 (Ill. C. Ct. Cook Co., 1948); 1i B.S.
i0--2822 (Ill. R, 1948); 11 B.S. 7-12589 (Kan. R, i947); 10 B.S. 3-11286 (Colo. R,
1946); 9 B.S. 9-10795 (Ind. R, 1946); 5 B.S. 9-7521 (Ark. R, 1942); 5 B.S. 9-7534 (N.D. D,
r941); 4 B.S. 7-6134 (Mass. A, 194); 4 B.S. 6-5956 (Ore. A, 194); 4 B.S. 4-5533 (Conn.
R, 194o); 3 B.S. 10-4553 (Wash. A, 1940); 2 B.S. 2-855 (Conn. R, 1938) (strike to prevent
wage cut); 2 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep. 12,528 (D.C. App. Exam. 3098, 1949).
Ts Huiet v. Boyd, 64 Ga. App. 564, 13 S.E. 2d 863 (I941); Wasyluk v. Mack Mfg. Co.,
68 A. 2d 264 (N.J. Super. Ct., z949); ii B.S. 5-12420 (Conn. R, 1947); 5 B.S. Io-76io
(Mich. R, 1942); 4 B.S. 7-6134 (Mass. A, 1941).
XSSNobes v. Michigan UCC, 33 Mich. 472, 21 N.W. 2d 820 (1946); 5 B.S. 10-761o
(Mich. R, 1942).
,i6 Cases cited note 155 supra. 157.5 B.S. Io-76io (Mich. R, 1942).
'ss 4 B.S. 7-6134 (Mass. A, 1941); 4 B.S. 4-5533 (Conn. R, 1940).
,s9 Kemiel v. Review Board, 117 Ind. App. 357, 72 N.E. 2d 238 (1947) (nonunion employee
prevented from working by picket line); Huiet v. Boyd, 64 Ga. App. 564, 13 S.E. 2d 863
(1941) (same).
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But where the success of the labor dispute would not bring over-all
benefits to a claimant, the twofold justification for the provision obvi-
ously no longer "justifies." By hypothesis the employee's receipt of bene-
fits would in no way evade either the "participation" clause or any con-
cept of "neutrality." Nevertheless the American decisions have followed
the best British tradition 6 ° and disqualified even where the employees'
demands involve damage to the individual claimants' rights,'6 1 let alone
where the effect on the claimant is dubious. 6 2 Seldom has a court indi-
cated that it recognizes the inherent inconsistency of denying benefits
to a nonunion worker whose unemployment is caused by a strike for a
closed shop. 6 ' However, this is cause to scourge the legislatures rather
than the courts, for as long as the statutes remain solely in terms of
"direct interest," the judiciary cannot justifiably attempt to decide cases
in terms of "beneficial interest."
One fault which is properly attributable to the courts is their failure
to give content to the word "direct." Unlike the British decisions, which
draw a sensible and understandable line between "direct" and "indirect"
interest,'6 most American opinions employ any discoverable interest,
160 "[I]f the issue of the dispute which causes the stoppage would directly affect the claim-
ant's hours of work or wages, he is 'directly interested' in the dispute... even though he
stands to lose, and not to gain, if the employees engaged in the dispute bring it to a successful
issue ...... Ministry of Labour, Analytical Guide U.I. Code 7, Part III, § 102 (1939 ed.);
Brit. Ump. 692/25, BU-639 (1925).
1
6
1 Hniet v. Boyd, 64 Ga. App. 564, 13 S.E. 2d 863 (i94i) (nonunion claimant disqualified
in stoppage due to closed-shop strike); 9 B.S. ii-io988 (N.C. R, 1946) (same); 2 B.S. 6-r558
(Mich. A, 1939) (nonunion employee who tried to cross picket line held "directly interested"
in strike to replace departmental seniority system with shop seniority, although net result
was lowering of employee's seniority and earning power).
.62In re Deep River Timber Company's Employees, 8 Wash. 2d 179, IXI P. 2d 575 (i94r);
7 B.S. 4r-8482 (Ill. R, 1943); 2 B.S. I2-2243 (Mich. A, 1939); 2 B.S. 8-956 (Ore. R, i939).
x63 In UCC v. Lunceford, 229 N.C. 570, 50 S.E. 2d 497 (1948), claimants were nonunion
cotton-mill workers thrown out of work by a closed-shop strike. The court held that they were
not "directly interested," but disqualified them nevertheless because union members held to be
of their "grade or class" were interested in the strike's secondary purpose, a general wage in-
crease. Thus the court's holding on the "direct interest" issue becomes no more than dictum,
joining two other dicta as the only authority on its side of the question; see Outboard, Marine
& Mfg. Co. v. Gordon, 403 111. 523, 87 N.E. 2d 61o (i949); 4 B.S. 4-5533 (Conn. R, x940).
164 Although so brief a statement is of necessity inaccurate, the distinction may be sum-
marized as one between employees whose interests will automatically be ascertained by
settlement of the dispute and employees whose interests may or will be reviewed and altered
in the light of such settlement. Compare Ministry of Labour, Analytical Guide U.I. Code 7,
Part III, §§ X02-5 (1939 ed.) and cases cited therein.
Two Connecticut decisions handed down the same day serve as admirable illustrations.
Where the claimant's nonstriking union had decided to be bound by the negotiations of the
striking union, the claimant was disqualified. xo B.S. 12-12oi6 (Conn. R, 1946). In the other
case the nonunion claimant's group, clerical workers, had neither participated in the strike nor
in the negotiation. Claimant received a wage increase when the strike was settled, but the
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remote or immediate, 165 future or present,' 66 potential or actual,16 7 to
impose disqualification. Illinois ranks among the chief offenders in this
regard. Its administrators have found "direct interest" in the possibility
that nonstriking claimants may, at some future date, be affected by or
interested in the interpretation and enforcement of a collective bargain-
ing agreement or of the employer's management prerogatives currently
in dispute. 68 Its Supreme Court has outdone even these decisions by
its remarkable statement in Local No. 658 v. Brown Shoe Company:
"When a labor dispute, which concerns a part or all employees, causes,
as a direct result, a stoppage of work, it is one in which, under Section 7
(d), every employee thereby put out of employfient is directly inter-
ested."' 69 By a single sentence the court has thus effectively repealed the
entire statutory exception to the labor-dispute provision.
Perhaps it is to avoid decisions like that in the Brown Shoe case that
some jurisdictions have taken the equally indefensible step of equating
"directly interested" to "participating." Kieckhefer Container Co. v.
UCC 1 70 involved a union's strike concerning hours, wages, vacations,
reporting pay, and grievance procedure for all employees. Yet the New
raise was caused by management's desire to maintain appropriate wage differentials. No
disqualification resulted. io B.S. 10-11842 (Conn. R, 1946); cf. 5 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep.
33,6io (N.J. Board of Review BRL-8iS-r, i949).
6S In re Deep River Timber Company's Employees, 8 Wash. 2d 179, iiI P. 2d 575 (1941)
(CIO claimants unemployed in AFL strike to compel new employee to join AFL or be dis-
charged held "interested" in employee's continued working and CIO membership).
'6 9 B.S. 12-12029 (Ill. R, i945), aff'd sub nom. Absher v. Gordon (i11. C. Ct. Saline Co.,
1946); 4 B.S. i z-6633 (111. D, 1941). But cf. 4 B.S. 9-6433 (Ind. A, 1941); 3 B.S. o--4552
(Wash. A, 1940); 3 B.S. 6-3605 (Ind. R, 1939).
x67 3 B.S. 10-4553 (Wash. A, 1940) (nonunion employees disqualified though benefits did
not result from strikers' negotiation); 3 B.S. 2-2707 (Mass. A, 1939) (same); 3 B.S. 2-2703
(Ill. R, 1939) (same) aff'd sub nom. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Director of Labor (Ill.
C. Ct., 1940); 2 B.S. 11-2139 (Iowa A, 1939) (same). Contra: io B.S. io--z842 (Conn. R,
1946), discussed note 164 supra; cf. 6 B.S. 6-8oo6 (Mich. A, 1942).
168 Cases cited note 166 supra.
169 403 Il1. 484, 491, 87 N.E. 2d 625, 630 (x949). Careful reading of this confusing opinion
seems to disclose that the holding of "direct interest" was based on nothing more than the fact
that claimants, whose conditions of employment had already been amicably settled, were
members of the same union as the disputants, the NLRB having certified a single bargaining
agent for all production and maintenance workers. This is in sharp contrast to the carefully
reasoned decision first reached in this case. Docket No. 3o634, 3 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep.
16,556 (1948). It is also totally inconsistent with the approach taken in Outboard, Marine &
Mfg. Co. v. Gordon, 4o3 Ill. 523, 87 N.E. 2d 6io (1949), decided at the same term. In 4 B.S.
6-5941 (Mo. D, 1940) the facts were identical to those of the Brown Shoe case, even
involving a shoe factory. Since the dispute affected only the participants, they alone were
held disqualified under the "direct interest" test; Cl. 5 B.S. i0-7611 (Mich. A, 1942).
17o 125 N.J.L. 52, 13 A. 2d 646 (i94o).
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Jersey court rejected the "strained interpretation" which would have
disqualified nonunion claimants as directly interested, ruling instead
that only those creating or participating in the strike were barred from
benefits.'71 The New Jersey administrators have erected a unique edifice
on the same illogical foundation.'
Fortunately the choice is not one between New Jersey's nullification
of the "directly interested" proviso and Illinois' more drastic judicial
surgery. "Direct interest" can serve as a useful criterion to courts which
will recognize that in some cases unemployed claimants may be only
"indirectly interested" in the subject matter of the dispute. And the
legislatures can transform that useful criterion into a theoretically justi-
fied criterion by amending the phrase to read "directly and beneficially
interested."
THE MEANING OF ccGRADE OR CLASS"
Anyone confronted with a "grade or class" problem under the un-
employment compensation laws possesses one sure-fire first step in
reaching a proper solution: Throw away all the American precedents
and start from scratch. Whatever the cause, administrators and judges
alike have defined the statutory terms with total disregard for the basic
premise underlying the provision. The resulting body of doctrine formu-
lates the most remarkable principles of vicarious guilt found in the law.
Nearly every statute which contains any exceptions to labor-dispute
disqualification couples the "participating-financing-directly interested"
proviso with a corresponding "grade or class" section. 3 Since this
means that a claimant may lose benefits although he himself is not a
"participant," does not "finance," and has no "direct interest," the pro-
vision cannot be based on the corresponding theories of voluntary un-
17 The Kieckhefer decision was approved and adopted in Wicklund v. Comm'r, i8 Wash.
2d 2o6, 214, 138 P. 2d 876, 88i (1943): "The words 'directly interested in the labor dispute'
are clearly limited in their application to those employees directly interested in furtherance
of the dispute by participation and activity therein."
172 4 B.S. 12-6732 (N.J. D, 194); 4 B.S. 4-5551 (N.J. D, 1940); 4 B.S. 3-5358 (N.J. D,
1940); 4 B.S. 3-5357 (N.J. D, 1940); 3 B.S. 1o-4547 (N.J. D, 1940); 3 B.S. 9-4337 (N.J.
R, 14o); 3 B.S. 8-4143 (N.J. D, 1940); Cf. 2 B.S. 8-1857 (R.I. D, 1939).
The most recent New Jersey decision, Wasyluk v. Mack Mfg. Co., 68 A. 2d 264 (N.J.
Super. Ct., 1949), distinguished the Kieckhefer case in disqualifying the claimants involved.
This case may foreshadow a more sensible approach in future New Jersey decisions.
173 Only Louisiana and Vermont have enacted no provision comparable to a "grade or class"
clause. The Connecticut statute cited note s supra refers to "trade, class, or organization"; the
Utah act speaks of "grade, class, or group"; Rhode Island disqualifies members of an "organi-
zation or group responsible for the stoppage of work." In Idaho and South Dakota the grade
or class provision extends only to those "participating or directly interested," even though
individual bases for disqualification are broader.
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employment, payment of strike benefits, or loss of state neutrality.
Instead, the danger of omitting the "grade or class" clause has been
thus expressed:
It would permit a stoppage of work to be embarked on by the withdrawal of a small
number of pivotal men in the establishment in the knowledge that a majority of work-
ers will get benefits and thus augment the workers' fighting fund. On the other hand, it
permits the unemployment compensation system to be used to induce defections from
a union which calls a strike by the promise of benefits to workers who take no part
in it.174
Obviously these objections are largely dispelled by the "direct inter-
est" provision, which extends to all employees affected by the dispute,
whether participants or nonparticipants, union or nonunion. Only a
small area thus remains for operation of the "grade or class" disqualifi-
cation. This area involves situations in which the individual's proximity
to the dispute is not great enough to disqualify him personally but is
great enough so that paying benefits would permit evasion of the basic
purposes of the acts. 5
Simple illustrations may clarify the distinction. If a union which is
bargaining agent for all employees in a plant calls a general wage strike
in which only union men participate, a nonunion machinist and a non-
union clerk are nevertheless both disqualified for "direct interest.'
76
But if the union represents only union machinists and strikes to increase
only their pay, neither nonunion employee has an interest sufficient to
disqualify him as an individual. The clerk may receive a raise if the
strike is successful, but only because of the employer's wish to maintain
given wage differentials. He should therefore not be disqualified for the
degree of "indirect interest" which he possesses-the strikers are not
members of his "grade or class."M  But the nonunion machinist is cer-
tain to receive a raise because the employer pays all men doing the same
work at the same rate. Here the claimant's interest is "indirect," but
allowing him benefits would permit the "key man" type of strike and
174 Lesser, op. cit. supra note 8, at 169;VDouglas, op. cit. supra note 6 at 62; see In re St.
Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 7 Wash. 2d 58o, 595, 110 P. 2d 877, 884 (194r); Chrysler Corp.
v. Smith, 297 Mich. 438, 450, 298 N.W. 87, gr (1941); Spielman v. Industrial Comm'n, 234
Wis. 240, 248-49, 295 N.W. i, 4 (ig4o). The basis of this explanation was criticized in Queener
v. Magnet Mills, Inc., 179 Tenn. 416, 167 S.W. 2d 1 (1942) as inapplicable to labor conditions
in the United States. The criticism may be apt, but it logically leads to the conclusion that
the entire "grade or class" proviso is similarly inapplicable and should be repealed.
17s Eligibility for Unemployment Benefits of Persons Involuntarily Unemployed because of
Labor Disputes, 49 Col. L. Rev. 55o, 553 (,949).
176 See, for example, Kemiel v. Review Board, 117 Ind. App. 357, 72 N.E. 2d 238 (1947).
177 Cases cited in second paragraph of note x64 supra.
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would discourage union membership. This conclusion is expressed by
holding that members of his "grade or class" (i.e., machinists) are par-
ticipating or directly interested in the dispute. 8
All this is simple and plausible enough, requiring only application of a
few basic principles. One is that "grade or class" should be determined
in terms of the dispute itself,'79 not in a vacuum of vague platitudes
about what "ordinarily" constitutes a grade or class. Another is that
"grade" and "class" were put in the alternative so as to narrow dis-
qualification, not broaden it: "What the section means is that if the
dispute relates only to men of a particular grade one must see whether
the applicant belongs to that grade; if the dispute relates to a class of
workers one must see whether the applicant belongs to that class."'8 0
It follows that "grade" or "class" may in a given case be dependent upon
similarity in type of work, occupation, conditions of work, methods or
rates of pay, union membership or eligibility therefor, or the employees'
age-but only when the dispute itself makes that factor significant.
Such a sensible rationale is conspicuous by its absence from this
country's decisions. 18' Here the typical approach is to look almost ex-
clusively at the type of work performed, lumping the largest number of
employees possible into a so-called "class." Most popular seems to be
the "class" of "production workers,"'1 82 a grouping adopted whether the
17S ee Brit. Ump. 8344, BU-6o8 (1924); 1O B.S. 8-11700 (Ind. R, 1946). The British
Umpire's decision cited above contains the most rational discussion of the grade or class pro-
viso ever expressed on a practical level. Yet it has received virtually no attention in this coun-
try, even from the writers. One exception is Hughes, op. cit.'supra note io, at 83-84, quoting
the opinion in full.,
179Brit. Ump. 89io, dU-647 (1947); Brit. Ump. 8344, BU-6o8 (1924). Thus, where the
employer causes a strike by seeking to reduce the wages of all employees over twenty-one it
should be clear that the only "class" involved is that of age. Nonparticipants under twenty-one
should not be disqualified even if they perform identical work. Brit. Ump. 3465/1929, BU-65o
(1929); cf. Brit. Ump. 6488/1929, BU-665 (1929); see generally Ministry of Labour, Analytical
Guide U.I. Code 7, Part II, §§ lo6-i6 (i939 ed.).
zSo Ministry of Labour, Analytical Guide U.I. Code 7, Part I, § 107 (1939 ed.), quoting
Brit. Ump. 8344, BU-6o8 (1924).
is. Strikingly enough, the one American court which has adopted an approach nearly
identical to that of the British Umpire believed that it was completely overthrowing British
reasoning and precedent by its decision. Queener v. Magnet Mills, Inc., 179 Tenn. 416, 767
S.W. 2d I (1942).
r82 Local No. 658 v. Brown Shoe Co., 403 Ill 484, 87 N.E. 2d 625 (,949); ii B.S. 9-12742
(Mass. R, 1948); ix B.S. 9-12737 (Kan. R, 1948); IO B.S. Io-11867 (Neb. R, 1946); 9 B.S.
11-1o989 (N.D. A, 1946); 9 B.S. 4/5-io5OO (Va. R, 1945); 6 B.S. 9-8129 (Mass. R, 1943);
5 B.S. 4-7161 (II. D, 1941); 4 B.S. 11-6733 (N.J. D, 1941); 4 B.S. 11-6634 (Ind. R, i94o);
4B.S. 6-5954 (Ore. A, 194); 4 B.S. 5-5717 (Ind. R, 194o). In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v.
UCB of Review, 68 A. 2d 393 (Pa. Super. Ct., 1949), AFL production workers were denied
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dispute relates only to red-headed engineers or whether it actually in-
volves all production workers. Consequently thousands of individuals
have been disqualified without having the remotest connection with a
dispute. Equally erroneous results have been reached by indiscriminate
use of union membership""3 or the size of the bargaining unit certified
by the NLRB.18 1 Worst of all, many decisions point to "functional inte-
gration" and "interdependence of operations" as grounds for disqualifi-
cation, ignoring the fact that using these criteria is tantamount to deny-
ing benefits simply because the claimant is unemployed. 5
One of the most frequently encountered "grade or class" problems
involves a strike by workers in one department of an assembly-line
process. Work in prior departments quickly piles up a backlog and work
in subsequent departments ceases for lack of materials, culminating in a
total shutdown. In Local No. 658 v. Brown Shoe Company,86 the em-
ployer's suggested change in the procedure of repairing defective shoes
had been accepted by all of the 450 production employees with the ex-
benefits as the result of a CIO strike for recognition as sole bargaining agent, the court stressing
the "grade or class" provision.
Of course, where claimants are foremen unemployed due to a strike of production workers,
the "production worker" classification leads to correct results. ii B.S. 9-12737 (Kan. R,
1948); 9 B.S. 6-1o563 (N.C. R, 1946); 4 B.S. 2-5226 (N.J. D, 1940); 4 B.S. 2-5220 (Mo. D,
1940); 2 B.S. 3-io66 (Minn. A, 1938).
183 Local No. 658 v. Brown Shoe Co., 403 Ill. 484, 87 N.E. 2d 625 (i949); 7 B.S. 4 -8482
(Ill. R, 1943). In Copen v. Hix, 43 S.E. 2d 382, 385 (W.Va., 1947) claimants were rank-and-
file miners thrown out of work by a foremen's strike. The court disqualified claimants on the
amazing ground that they belonged to the same national union as the strikers: "[W]e are of
the opinion that 'grade or class' is a term coextensive with the national jurisdiction of the
organization to which the claimant belongs and to which the local union of which he is a
member is subservient .... "
Occasionally union membership has been properly applied as the "grade or class" criterion,
usually where two different unions are involved. Outboard, Marine & Mfg. Co. v. Gordon,
403 Ill. 523, 87 N.E. 2d 61o (1949); 4 B.S. 11-6636 (Ind. A, 1941); 2 B.S. 5-428 (Ore. A,
1938); cf. 9 B.S. io--o9o5 (N.J. R, 1946).
18 4 Local No. 658 v. Brown Shoe Co., 403 Ill. 484, 87 N.W. 2d 625 (1949); Johnson v.
Pratt, 200 S.C. 3r5, 20 S.E. 865 (1942); to B.S. Io-ii867 (Neb. R, 1946); 1o B.S. 3-11296
(Ill. R, 1946); io B.S. 1-11r28 (Ind. R, 1946); cf. Members of Iron Workers' Union of Provo
v. Industrial Comm'n, io4 Utah 242, 139 P. 2d 208 (1943); see Queener v. Magnet Mills, Inc.,
179 Tenn. 416, 367 S.W. 2d 1 (1942); cf. ii B.S. 9-12742 (Mass. R, 1948). Contra: 5 B.S.
4-7168 (N.H. D, 194); see 4 B.S. 2-6733 (N.J. D, 1941). Itis ironic that legislation passed
to strengthen labor organization, such as the NLRA, should be employed to impose sweeping
and unjustified disqualification for unemployment benefits.
18s io B.S. 6--i604 (Va. R, 1946); 10 B.S. 3-11296 (Ill. R, 1946); 7 B.S. 4-8482 (il.
R, 1943); 4 B.S. 11-6634 (Ind. R, x940); 4 B.S. 9-6433 (Ind. A, 1941); 3 B.S. 4-3119
(Mass. A, 1939); see io B.S. 1-11128 (Ind. R, 1946). Just as in the "factory, establishment,
or other premises" cases, a claimant would scarcely be required to apply for compensation if
his work were not dependent on that of the disputant employees.
'8 4 0 3 Ill. 484, 87 N.E. 2d 625 (i949).
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ception of eighteen "lasters." Despite joint pressure from the union and
the employer, the eighteen walked out. The loss of two-fifths of the
employees in one of the nine departments in the continuous production
chain caused a complete plant stoppage. Even though the dispute related
only to the working conditions of the lasters, the court disqualified all
450 production workers, coupling its erroneous holding on the "direct
interest" point 8 ' with an equally bad "class" decision:
The fact that all of the employees of appellant seeking benefits have by their own act
placed themselves in the class of "production and maintenance" workers by being
members of the same union, and by jointly making said union their bargaining agent,
excludes a division of classes smaller than that. They were also jointly engaged in a
continuous and co-ordinated process for the production of one finished product. 88
Basing the decision on the "class" of production workers instead of on
the "grade" of lasters produced an incorrect result, but it placed the
Illinois court in excellent company."8 9 The Brown Shoe decision is symp-
tomatic of the prevailing approach, which almost invariably frustrates
the very purpose of unemployment compensation. 90
The bare handful of decisions employing the proper analysis of the
"grade or class" issue' 91 holds out little hope for future enlightenment
of the majority. Here, indeed, is a concept distorted beyond recognition
by an encrustation which began as harmless "judicial gloss." Unfortu-
nately, the courts' natural reluctance to abandon stare decisis, however
,sT See text at note 169 supra.
' 403 Ill. 484, 492, 87 N.E. 2d 625, 630 (I949). This unanimous decision on rehearing
reached a conclusion wholly opposite in every respect from that originally announced in
Docket No. 30634, 3 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep. 16,5s6 (1948).
189 Basically identical situations were dealt with in similar fashion in UCC v. Martin,
228 N.C. 277, 45 S.E. 2d 385 (1947); Johnson v. Pratt, 200 S.C. 315, 20 S.E. 2d 865 (1942);
3 C.C.H. Unempl. Ins. Rep. 17,520 (Ind. Review Board 48-LDR-I, x949); x B.S. II-12899
(Mass. R, 1948); 1o B.S. 8-II7oo (Ind. R, 1946); io B.S. 4- i439 (W.Va. A, 1946); 4 B.S.
2-5211 (Conn. R, 194o); see 2 B.S. 11-2139 (Iowa A, x939). Contra: 8 B.S. 11-10023
(Mo. R, 9945); 4 B.S. 6-5941 (Mo. D, 1940); 4 B.S. 5-5718 (Ind. A, 194o); cf. 9 B.S. 6-
1o564 (N.C. R, 1946).
190 See, for example, zo B.S. io-ii867 (Neb. R, 1946) (nonunion claimants disqualified
because union to which fellow production workers belonged gave $ioo to striking union);
10 B.S. 1-11122 (Ill. R, 1946) (nonunion part-time employee denied benefits during union
strike for salary increase only for regular employees); 9 B.S. 11-10975 (Mass, R, 1946) (non-
union production worker, prevented by threats of violence from crossing picket line in office
employees' strike, disqualified because union production workers refused to cross as sympathy
measure); 9 B.S. 6-io562 (N.C. R, x946) (entire plant disqualified in union strike for union
members' benefit, since union had members in every department).
19' io B.S. 11-11932 (Il.. R, 1947); 9 B.S. 12-lio63 (Mo. D, 1946); 4 B.S. 8-6288
(Va. D, 1941); 3 B.S. I0-4552 (Wash. A, 1940); 2 B.S. 6-x563 (W.Va. A, 1939); cf. Kieck-
hefer Container Co. v. UCC, 125 N.J.L. 52, 13 A. 2d 646 (1940); 4 B.S. 6-5934 (Ark. A,
1940); 4 B.S. 5-5719 (Mass. R, X940); 2 B.S. 11-2137 (Ind. A, 1939).
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bad their own precedents, virtually compels the application of external
force-again by the legislature.
CONCLUSION
"Grade or class" serves as a particularly appropriate final topic in any
discussion of labor-dispute disqualification. It presents in exaggerated
form nearly every question encountered in dealing with any aspect of
the subject. As in every case, the concept was introduced to solve a spe-
cific problem in the light of certain basic underlying theories. No defi-
nition was furnished to aid the courts, and consequently judicial growth
has proceeded in the wrong direction. If the trend becomes plainly dis-
cernible and the legislative tenor has remained relatively static, the cycle
may be completed by explanatory amendment. The better solution-the
growth of an informed case law-is all too slow in coming. Meanwhile,
the mistaken decisions continue.
